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WHETHER  OR NOT a long-run  tradeoff  exists  between  unemployment  and 
inflation,  there  seems  to be little  politically  acceptable  opportunity,  except 
in the short  run,  to buy employment  at the cost of inflation.  Exponents  of 
the Phillips  curve  find that it is steep, and accelerationists  find that the 
natural  unemployment  rate  is high. Hall recently  estimated  that a 5.5 per- 
cent aggregate  unemployment  rate is necessary  merely  to keep inflation 
from  accelerating.'  These  findings  point  to a high  floor  for unemployment, 
which  is resistant  to a one-dimensional  stabilization  policy depending  on 
manipulation  of aggregate  demand. 
This  realization  has led to a search  for structural  factors  that make the 
economy  particularly  prone  to unemployment  and inflation,  a search  that 
has uncovered  the disturbing  charge  that the government  itself promotes 
unemployment  through  the  unemployment  insurance  system.  The  system  is 
by far  the most important  support  for unemployed  workers  in America.  It 
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pays  benefits  to between  36 percent  and  61 percent2  of the unemployed,  in 
amounts  totaling $5.2 billion in fiscal year 1974 and projected  at $13.6 
billion  for fiscal 1975.3  Direct intervention  into the labor market  of this 
magnitude  cannot  fail to have some effect  upon the behavior  of workers 
and  firms. 
The critics  of the system  assert  that it subsidizes  workers  to extend  the 
duration  of their  unemployment,  and, consequently,  greatly  increases  un- 
employment  and wastes  labor resources.  In a careful  investigation,  this 
study  finds  empirical  evidence  supporting  such a subsidizing  effect;  but it 
does  not appear  to be a powerful  cause  for the unemployment  problems  of 
the seventies.  The study  also discusses  the charge  that unemployment  in- 
surance  induces  employers  to expand  seasonally  variable  employment,  but 
does  not estimate  the size of such an increase. 
This  paper  does not take a position  on the welfare  impact  of the unem- 
ployment  insurance  system.  That  issue requires  a careful  balancing  of the 
virtues  of the system  in maintaining  income and stimulating  job search 
against  any tendency  the program  has to aggravate  unemployment.  Any 
serious  study of the welfare  impact  must begin with an estimate  of the 
magnitude  of these  effects. 
Unemployment  Insurance  and  the Duration  of Unemployment 
The  issue  of whether  unemployment  insurance  serves  as an incentive  to 
extend  joblessness  is a traditional  one, first arising  when the system  was 
established  in 1935,  but it has attracted  special  attention  in recent  years  for 
two  reasons.  One  is the desire  to fashion  a coherent  manpower  policy  in the 
wake  of disillusionment  with aggregate  monetary  and fiscal  policies.  The 
second  is the emergence  of the job-search  and labor-turnover  theories  of 
unemployment,  which emphasize  the dynamic  nature  of unemployment 
and  its duration. 
The  rules  governing  unemployment  insurance  vary  among  the states,  but 
the plans  usually  provide  weekly  payments  for a maximum  of 26 weeks.4 
Temporary  federal  programs  have  recently  added  39 weeks  to this  limit.  To 
2. The fraction  changes  cyclically.  See Gloria P. Green, "Measuring  Total and State 
Insured  Unemployment,"  Monthly  Labor  Review,  vol. 94 (June 1971),  pp. 37-48. 
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be eligible  for immediate  benefits  an individual  must  have  worked  in a job 
that  is covered  by  unemployment  insurance  for  a specified  minimum  period 
and  have  lost the  job involuntarily.  He must  be able  and  available  to work, 
and he may be disqualified  from  benefits  if he refuses  a suitable  offer. 
The  critics  of the system  argue  (1) that  it reduces  and sometimes  entirely 
eliminates  the cost of unemployment  imposed  on a worker  by wage  loss, 
and  (2) that because  they have unemployment  insurance,  workers  remain 
unemployed  longer  than they otherwise  would and substitute  leisure or 
job search  for work.5 
A second  possible  effect of unemployment  insurance  payments  on the 
duration  of unemployment  involves  the substitution  of time in the labor 
force  for time  out of it. In order  to collect  benefits  a worker  ordinarily  has 
to present  evidence  that  he is searching  for work-that he is indeed  unem- 
ployed.  The result  may be a charade  in which the recipient  pretends  to 
search,  but is in fact out of the labor  force;  in this case unemployment  in- 
surance  does  not really  induce  labor  force  participation,  though  there  may 
be an apparent  increase  in unemployment  that is merely  statistical.  How- 
ever,  the  recipient  may  in fact  as well  as appearance  be dissuaded  from  drop- 
ping  out of the  labor  force  after  a long period  of unemployment  because  he 
gets  paid  to search.  To the extent  that his search  is successful,  unemploy- 
ment  insurance  has a work-incentive  effect as well as a work-disincentive 
effect. 
Unemployment  insurance  might  increase  the number  of spells  of unem- 
ployment  as well as its duration.  Without  the benefits,  workers  would  re- 
quire  a higher  wage  to work  in a relatively  unstable  job, especially  a sea- 
sonal one. According  to Feldstein,  unemployment  insurance  reduces  the 
necessary  wage  premium  because  workers  know they can collect  benefits 
after  they are laid off.6 In effect,  the system  subsidizes  unstable  employ- 
ment,  permitting  it and  the number  of spells  of unemployment  to increase. 
This  subsidy  would  not exist  if the "experience-rating"  method  of financing 
unemployment  insurance  benefits  succeeded  in charging  the firm  for bene- 
5. Martin  S. Feldstein,  Lowering  the  Permanent  Rate of Unemployment,  A Study  Pre- 
pared  for the Use of the Joint Economic  Committee,  93 Cong. 1 sess. (1973); and Gene 
Chapin,  "Unemployment  Insurance,  Job Search  and the Demand  for Leisure,"  Western 
Economic  Journal,  vol. 9 (March 1971), pp. 102-07. Gary Fields has summarized  the 
issues  and much of the previous  empirical  evidence;  see his "The Direct Labor Market 
Effects  of the U.S. Unemployment  Insurance  System: A Review of Recent Evidence," 
Technical  Analysis  Paper  26 (U.S. Department  of Labor,  Office  of the Assistant  Secretary 
for Policy,  Evaluation  and Research,  1975; processed). 
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fits received  by employees  it has laid off.7  The experience-rating  system 
levies  taxes  on employers  according  to the  benefits  its former  employees  are 
drawing.  If the  system  were  perfect,  a firm  would  incur  payroll  taxes  exactly 
matching  the  benefits  its former  employees  collect,  so that  it would  enjoy  no 
subsidy  to unstable  employment.  However,  the system  has maximum  and 
minimum  tax rates  that  allow  some  firms  to pay  less in taxes  than  their  em- 
ployees  receive  in benefits  while  requiring  others  to pay more.  For firms  at 
these  limits  the marginal  cost of unemployment  insurance  is zero: an in- 
crease  in layoffs  will  result  in no increase  in taxes.  With  no offset,  an incen- 
tive toward  unstable  employment  remains. 
No empirical  estimate  of the increase  in unemployment  spells  due  to this 
cause  has been  made,  although  Baily  has investigated  the issue  in some  de- 
tail.8  If this adverse  incentive  is shown  to be sizable,  the appropriate  policy 
response  is to remove  the restrictions  on the experience-rating  system  so 
that firms  come closer to paying  the full cost of their layoffs.  Thus, the 
policy  implications  of this disincentive  effect  are very  different  from  those 
of other  such  effects,  which,  if they  prove  to be important,  appear  to require 
some  reduction  in benefits.  A separate  estimate  of the impact  of unemploy- 
ment  insurance  on unemployment  duration  is therefore  useful. 
Workers  are  unlikely  to quit  their  jobs in order  to collect  unemployment 
insurance  benefits. Job quitters  are heavily penalized  under the rules: 
thirty-two  states  deny  benefits  to job quitters  entirely,  and the other  states 
impose  a substantial  disqualification  period.  Basing  the taxation  system  on 
experience  rating  effectively  engages  employers  in policing  this rule: an 
employer  will  usually  inform  employment  agencies  about  a quitter  in order 
to disqualify  the employee  from  benefits  and  save  himself  from  higher  pay- 
roll taxes.  This  mechanism  is a strength  of the U.S. structure  of unemploy- 
ment insurance  that  is absent  from  those in other  countries. 
UNEMPLOYMENT  INSURANCE  AND  THE COST OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
Feldstein  argues  the case for the fall in the cost of unemployment  to 
workers  using  hypothetical  Boston families.9  In one example,  weekly  un- 
7. A subsidy would still exist, though it would be smaller, because unemployment 
insurance  benefits  are not taxable income whereas  the wage differential  between  stable 
and unstable  employment  in the absence  of the system  would be. 
8. Martin N. Baily, "Unemployment  and Unemployment  Insurance,"  Department 
of Economics  Discussion  Paper  29 (Yale University,  December  1974; processed). 
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employment  insurance  payments  average  80 to 90 percent  of the husband's 
previous  wages  net of taxes.  In other  examples,  the weekly  benefit  rate  ac- 
tually matches  or exceeds  the net wage. In a later study, Feldstein  still 
found  several  examples  of benefits  exceeding  previous  net wages,  but the 
average  replacement  rates  for all of the states  were  slightly  lower,  mostly 
between  60 and  80 percent.'0  Although  the U.S. Unemployment  Insurance 
Service  finds  that  Feldstein's  Massachusetts  examples  are of atypical  fami- 
lies in an atypical  state,  and  may  be incorrectly  calculated,  they  put benefit 
rates  in the range  of 50 to 70 percent  of net wages.11  In the most concep- 
tually  complete  estimates  of replacement-earnings  ratios,  Munts  and Gar- 
finkel  have  accounted  not only for the effect  of taxes  on the ratios,  as does 
Feldstein,  but also for the effects  of fringe  benefits  and average  wage in- 
creases.12  According  to their  results,  in Ohio unemployment  insurance  re- 
places  40 to 50 percent  of total remuneration  after taxes.  If workers  are 
utility  maximizers,  this will be the crucial  ratio  rather  than  the one involv- 
ing net wages  solely.  Without  similar  estimates  for other  states  the average 
replacement  rate is uncertain,  but it must lie between  one-half  and two- 
thirds.  Thus,  while  unemployment  insurance  substantially  reduces  the cost 
of unemployment,  it does not completely  eliminate  it. 
STUDYING  THE IMPACT  OF UNEMPLOYMENT  INSURANCE 
ON DURATION 
The  question  remains  whether  unemployment  insurance  payments  do in 
fact  induce  an alteration  in a worker's  job-search  behavior  and  therefore  in 
his duration  of unemployment.  Despite the long history of this debate, 
empirical  work  has only  recently  begun  to appear.  Any such  study  must  be 
based  upon a measurable  difference  in the system's  support  to individuals 
that can be associated  with a measurable  difference  in work effort. The 
literature  discusses  five distinct  strategies  for measuring  these  differentials: 
1. Interstate comparisons. Because the amount and coverage of unem- 
ployment  insurance  benefits  vary  widely  among  the states,  interstate  com- 
10. Martin  Feldstein,  "Unemployment  Compensation:  Adverse  Incentives  and Dis- 
tributional  Anomalies,"  National  Tax Journal,  vol. 27 (June 1974),  pp. 231-44. 
11. Interview,  Margaret  Dahm, Director,  Office  of Research  Legislation  and Program 
Policies,  Unemployment  Insurance  Service,  July 9, 1974. 
12. Raymond  Munts and Irwin Garfinkel,  Thze  Work  Disincentive  Effects of Unem- 
ployment  Insurance  (Kalamazoo: Upjohn Institute for Employment  Research, 1974), 
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parisons  provide  a kind  of natural  experiment.  Chapin  concludes  that  mean 
durations  of benefits  are  longer  in states  with  more  ample  benefits.'3  How- 
ever, his dependent  variable  is insured  duration  rather  than total dura- 
tion of unemployment,  and must be viewed with caution  because  of the 
strong  tendency  toward  liberality  in maximum  weeks of benefits  in states 
whose  maximum  weekly  amounts  are  liberal.14  Thus,  states  with  less ample 
benefits  may  merely  substitute  uninsured  unemployment  for  insured  unem- 
ployrnent  without  decreasing  the total. Chapin  also fails to control  ade- 
quately  for demographic  differences  among  the states. 
Gramlich,  who allows carefully  for demographic  effects, finds that 
workers  in states  with  wide  unemployment  insurance  coverage  spend  more 
time unemployed  than those in states  with narrower  coverage.15  But the 
more generous  states are characterized  by heavier  industrialization  and 
unionization,  which  may account  for their  higher  unemployment. 
Holen  and Horowitz  are aware  of the many  possible  directions  of cau- 
sality  between  unemployment  insurance  and  unemployment  and  have  built 
a multi-equation  model of state  unemployment,  hoping  to isolate  the im- 
pact  of the system  from  other  influences.16  Whether  they  have  succeeded  is 
questionable.  They find no significant  effect from the usual measures  of 
benevolence  (amount  of benefits,  coverage,  eligibility),  but a large  impact 
from the degree  to which states deny benefits  because  of voluntary  job 
termination  and  failure  to accept  employment.  Holen and Horowitz  inter- 
pret  their  results  to mean  that  tighter  administrative  screening  of claimants 
can motivate  more  vigorous  job search  and fewer  quits,  a surprising  con- 
clusion  in light  of their  negative  findings  on the other  elements  of liberality. 
Their  results  may be biased  by the occurrence  of low denial  rates during 
high  unemployment  periods  because  of low quit  rates  and  less frequent  job 
opportunities. 
2. Interpersonal  comparisons. Within any one state, one unemployed 
worker  will  receive  greater  benefits  than  another,  depending  upon  previous 
wage  and size of family.  The resulting  different  benefit-wage  ratios  do not 
result  in significantly  different  durations  of unemployment,  according  to 
13. Chapin,  "Unemployment  Insurance." 
14. Department  of Labor, Comparison  of State Unemployment  Insurance  Laws. 
15. Edward  M. Gramlich,  "The Distributional  Effects of Higher Unemployment," 
BPEA  (2:1974), pp. 293-336. 
16. Arlene  Holen and Stanley A. Horowitz, The Effect of Unemployment  Insurance 
and  Eligibility  Enforcement  on Unemployment  (Arlington,  Va.: Public  Research  Institute, 
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Lininger.17  He has controlled  for several  demographic  characteristics,  but 
he cannot  control  for income  effects  with this approach.  Without  differ- 
ences  in previous  incomes,  there  would  be very  little  variation  in benefits. 
3. Intertemporal  comparisons. The state systems  of unemployment  in- 
surance  have undergone  substantial  change since their inception  in the 
1930s,  in the direction  of greater  benefits  and  wider  coverage.  Although  at- 
tempts  have been made to measure  the resulting  changes  in unemploy- 
ment,18  in general  the revisions  have  been so gradual  that  the effects  of un- 
employment  insurance  are  difficult  to distinguish  from  other  changes  in the 
economy. 
4. Insured  vs. uninsured.  All states  have  complex  formulas  to determine 
the  eligibility  of unemployed  persons  for benefits.  Comparison  between  the 
job-search  activity  of insured  and  uninsured  unemployed  workers  appears  a 
fruitful  route  to uncovering  any  measurable  difference  in incentive.  In con- 
trast  with  the  other  strategies,  this  approach  offers  the advantage  of striking 
differences  in benefit  levels within  a single  jurisdiction. 
Only  Feldstein  has  attempted  this  direct  comparison.  In his controversial 
and  influential  testimony,  he compares  the average  duration  of unemploy- 
inent  of insured  workers  with  that of all workers.19  The present  study  pre- 
sents  an alternative  comparison  that  contrasts  sharply  with  Feldstein's  and 
is based  upon  more  accurate  estimates  of average  durations  of unemploy- 
ment  and  adjustments  for demographic  characteristics.  This study  uses its 
conclusions  to estimate  the  increase  in unemployment  that  can  be attributed 
to the unemployment  insurance  system. 
5. Insured  vs. exhaustees. All states  have  a maximum  duration  for bene- 
fits.  After  his "potential  benefits"  have  been  drawn,  a recipient  becomes  an 
"exhaustee"  even  if he remains  unemployed.  A comparison  of the search 
behavior  of unemployed  workers  during  and after the period of benefits 
would  be useful  in evaluating  the impact  of unemployment  insurance.  The 
advantage  of this approach  is that it eliminates  the problems  associated 
with  comparing  unequal  labor  groups,  while  retaining  a large  and sudden 
change  in benefit  levels. 
No such  study  has yet appeared.  This  paper  uses data  from  the so-called 
17. Charles  A. Lininger, Jr., Unemployment  Benefits and Duration (University of 
Michigan,  Institute  for Social Research,  1963). 
18. Baily,  "Unemployment  and Unemployment  Insurance." 
19. Martin  Feldstein,  "Policies to Lower the Permanent  Rate of Unemployment," 
in Reducing  Unemployment  to 2 Percent, Hearings before the Joint Economic Com- 
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"post-exhaustion"  studies  of the state  employment  agencies  and combines 
it with  data  on claims  to approximate  this comparison. 
PREVIOUS COMPARISON BETWEEN THE INSURED  AND  UNINSURED 
Feldstein  contrasts  the average  of 14.2  weeks  of unemployment  benefits 
drawn  per beneficiary  in fiscal year 1971 with an average  duration  of 8 
weeks  for the uninsured  unemployed,  estimated  from  the average  duration 
reported  by the  U.S. Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  of 10.1  weeks  for all unem- 
ployed.20  Feldstein  attributes  the difference  to the disincentive  effect  of un- 
employment  insurance,  but the data are not comparable  for at least three 
reasons. 
First,  the unemployment  insurance  figure  describes  insured  unemploy- 
ment  during  an entire  year,  which  often  includes  more  than  one spell  of un- 
employment  per  person.  The  BLS  figure  reports  the  average  number  of con- 
secutive  weeks  of unemployment  experienced  up to that point by workers 
who are unemployed  in the survey  week.  Thus,  the unemployment  insur- 
ance  figure  refers  to total weeks of unemployment  during  a year, in any 
number  of spells,  while  the BLS figure  refers  to weeks of unemployment 
during  a single  spell of unemployment.21 
Second,  the  BLS  reports  an average  duration  of unemployment  up to the 
time  of the survey-that is, an average  for spells  that are still in progress; 
the  average  for  weeks  of unemployment  insurance  benefits  drawn  per  bene- 
ficiary  is an average  for completed  spells.  The next section  demonstrates 
that the first  cannot  be usefully  compared  with the second or even with 
other  averages  that purport  to measure  continuing  spells. 
Third,  the insured  and  uninsured  unemployed  differ  greatly.  Thus,  some 
or all of the difference  in duration  may be due to demographic  differences 
rather  than  to insurance. 
The body of this paper  is an attempt  to adjust  for these three  problems 
and  thereby  provide  a better  comparison  of the insured  and uninsured  un- 
20. Ibid. Shortly  after these hearings,  Feldstein  became  aware of the difficulties  here 
and removed  the comparison  from his study, Lowering  the Permanent  Rate of Unem- 
ployment.  The study,  a denunciation  of the current  program,  unfortunately  is thus virtu- 
ally devoid  of empirical  evidence  on the current  impact of unemployment  insurance  in 
the United States. 
21. The unemployment  insurance  figure  for the average  duration  of a spell of insured 
unemployment  was 7.0 weeks in 1971, but for reasons discussed below it cannot be 
appropriately  compared  with the 10.1-week  average  for the duration  of unemployment 
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employed.  The first  step is to define  average  duration  of unemployment 
more  precisely. 
The  Average  Duration  of Unemployment 
Kaitz  has  pointed  out two distinct  ways  of looking  at the duration  of un- 
employment.22  In the  first,  a survey  is conducted  at a single  moment  in time 
to query  unemployed  workers  and measure  the length of each unemploy- 
ment  spell up to that moment,  even though  it is not yet complete.  From 
these  numbers  the  average  duration  of unemployment  is calculated.  In 1969 
it was 8.0 weeks. 
In the second  approach,  the duration  of unemployment  is measured  at 
the  time  of completion  of the spell.  The  mean  of these  durations  is referred 
to here  as the expected  duration  of unemployment.  Kaitz calculated  this 
mean  to be 4.6 weeks  in 1969  in the United States. 
Figure  1 shows  how the two measures  compare.  Of the six spells  in this 
example,  only  three  were  caught  by the survey.  The  T variables  measure  the 
duration  of unemployment  up to the time of the survey,  while  C measures 
the entire  spell.  Thus  the average  duration  is the average  of T1,  T3,  and  T4, 
but  the expected  duration  is the average  of all C1  through  C6.  The average 
duration  suffers  from  two flaws  as a measure  of unemployment  duration: 
(1) it measures  only part of any spell of unemployment,  and (2) because 
longer  spells  have  a better  chance  of getting  into the survey  sample,  it over- 
samples  long spells.  The first  flaw  tends  to make  the average  duration  less 
than  the expected  duration,  while  the second  tends  to make  it greater.  It is 
not difficult  to show that, as long as the fraction  of a cohort of workers 
leaving unemployment  each week diminishes  as their unemployment 
lengthens,  the  average  duration  will  be greater  than  the  expected  duration.23 
Furthermore,  the average  duration  for one group  of unemployed  can be 
longer  than  that of another  group  at the same  time  that its expected  dura- 
tion  is shorter  than  the other's.24  Clearly,  average  duration  is an unreliable 
indicator  of expected  duration. 
22. Hyman  B. Kaitz, "Analyzing  the Length of Spells of Unemployment,"  Monthly 
Labor  Review,  vol. 93 (November 1970), pp. 11-20. 
23. Stephen  W. Salant, "Search  Theory and Duration Data: A Theory of Sorts," 
Special  Studies  Paper  42 (Federal  Reserve Board, Division of Research  and Statistics, 
1974;  processed),  p. 3. 
24. For examples  of this behavior  among industrial  groups, see ibid., p. 19. 22  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
Figure 1.  Comparison  of Two Measures of the Average Duration of 
Unemployment:  Length to Time of Survey and Length to Completion 
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Source: Adapted from Stephen W. Salant, "Search Theory and Duration Data: A Theory of Sorts," 
Special Studies Paper 42 (Federal Reserve Board, Division of Research and Statistics, 1974; processed). 
See discussion in the text. 
a. Six spells of unemployment  are shown: C measures their completed length and T measures their length 
to the time of the survey. 
Expected  duration  has the meaning  intuitively  associated  with "average 
duration  of unemployment"  and should  be used in comparisons.  Average 
duration  appears  to have little to recommend  it beyond  its simplicity  in 
calculation. 
Comparison  of Expected  Durations  for the Insured  and  All Unemployed 
Unemployment  insurance  might  cause  insured  workers  to remain  unem- 
ployed  longer  than  they otherwise  would,  for two reasons:  they could  be- 
come  more  selective  about  the  jobs they  will  accept  or they  could  postpone 
withdrawing  from  the labor  force  longer.  One way to make  a quantitative Stephen T. Marston  23 
assessment  of the impact  of unemployment  insurance  is to compare  the ex- 
pected  duration  of insured  unemployment  (ED,) with the expected  dura- 
tion of uninsured  unemployment  (EDN). 
Because  there  are  no data  that  identify  the  uninsured  as an explicit  group, 
I measure  the expected  duration  for all unemployed  (EDT)  and for the in- 
sured  unemployed  and  infer  that of the uninsured  as a weighted  difference 
between  the two. The data for all unemployed  come from the Current 
Population  Survey  and  the  data  for  the  insured  from  administrative  records 
of unemployment  insurance  claimants  at state employment  agencies.  The 
experiment  is focused  on 1969. 
The  method  for  estimating  the expected  duration  for  the  total  population 
is presented  in appendix  A. Since  one must  control  for demographic  influ- 
ences  on expected  duration,  EDT  is estimated  separately  for each of twelve 
demographic  groups  (male  and female,  six age groups).  The data used  for 
this  purpose  are  the familiar  duration  groupings  published  by BLS  in Em- 
ployment and Earnings.25 They give the number  of workers  in the survey 
who  reported  an unemployment  spell of a length  falling  within  a given  in- 
terval  of weeks.  These  are  lengths  of still  incomplete  spelis,  so that  one  must 
estimate  the mean  length  of completed  spelis.  The method  uses a model  of 
unemployment  to infer  the statistical  process  that generates  the BLS data 
on incomplete  spells,  which  is then integrated  to derive  the mean of com- 
pleted  spells. 
The  mean  expected  duration  for  the  insured  unemployed  is more  difficult 
to calculate.  The available  national  averages  merely  count the number  of 
benefit  weeks  claimed  per spell of unemployment  (or, even less useful,  per 
year  of benefits)  without  allowing  for exhaustion  of benefits,  time unem- 
ployed  before  benefits  begin, or the differences  that arise  from  the multi- 
plicity  of unemployment  insurance  systems  and that are concealed  in the 
national  average.  I decided  to calculate  expected  duration  of insured  unem- 
ployment  from  a series  of unemployment  insurance  claims  over  time,  by a 
method  presented  in appendix  B. The data source  identifies  initial  claims 
for  unemployment  insurance-the number  of people  first  entering  employ- 
ment  offices  after  losing  their  jobs-and  continued  claims-the number  of 
people  returning  to employment  offices  each week  to collect  benefits.  The 
method  uses  the two series  to estimate  continuation  rates  (the fraction  of 
insured  workers  remaining  unemployed  each  week)  and  from  them  derives 
25. I obtained  a slightly  finer  breakdown  of duration  groups  directly  from BLS. 24  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
ED,. This  number  naturally  varies  with  the tightness  of the labor  market, 
so it is expressed  as a function  of an observable  proxy for labor market 
tightness  labeled  E. In effect,  I estimate  a function,  ED  =J(E) 
The  necessary  series  of unemployment  insurance  claims  are  collected  on 
a state  or  local  basis  because  the  systems  are  organized  and  administered  by 
state.  I use the series from the Detroit standard  metropolitan  statistical 
area,  because  Michigan  had a fairly  representative  unemployment  insur- 
ance system  and Detroit a fairly  representative  labor market  during  the 
sample  years  (1966-71),  despite  heavy  reliance  upon  the automobile  indus- 
try.  The  basic  rules  of eligibility  and  potential  duration  of benefits  are  simi- 
lar  to those  of other  states,  although  the maximum  benefit  is slightly  higher 
than  average  among  the  states,  in line  with  Michigan's  slightly  higher  wages. 
In 1969,  insured  unemployment  accounted  for 36.4 percent  of total unem- 
ployment  in Michigan,  comparing  closely  with  38.8  percent  in the  nation.26 
The  labor  market  was only very  slightly  looser  in Detroit  (3.7 percent  un- 
employment  rate)  than in the nation (3.5 percent).  Hall's study of labor 
turnover  in twelve  metropolitan  areas  puts  Detroit  among  the looser  of the 
labor  markets  (in 1966),  but the city came  nowhere  near  the worst.27 
Nevertheless,  precise  equality  between  the labor market  "tightness"  in 
the city and in the nation  is necessary  for comparisons  of durations.  This 
equality  is accomplished  by setting  the "tightness"  variable,  Et, the argu- 
ment  variable  of the insured  duration  in Detroit,  equal  to its value  in the 
nation in 1969. The resulting ED,  = f(E1969) can be compared with EDT 
because  the latter  was estimated  in the 1969  national  labor  market.28 
26.  Manpower Report of  the Presidenzt, March  1973,  table  D-3,  p.  205;  table  D-5, 
p. 207; table A-14, p. 145.  These numbers  exclude  insurance  programs  for veterans  and 
federal  workers,  for which comparable  data were not available. 
27. Robert  E. Hall, "Turnover  in the Labor Force,"  BPEA (3:1972), p. 735. 
28. To show this to be true, I first  define  Et as the rate of accessions  to jobs divided 
by the unemployment  rate. This variable  was selected  as the argument  for ED, because 
it gave  close statistical  fits, but it also turns  out to be close to proportional  to the recip- 
rocal of EDT. The number  of job accessions  is equal to the number  of spells of unem- 
ployment  in an economy in static equilibrium  with no one dropping  out of the labor 
force. Dividing  the number  of unemployed  by the number  of spells of unemployment 
yields,  by definition,  the expected  duration  of unemployment.  The variable  chosen as Et 
is seen  to be roughly  the reciprocal  of this result,  although  the variables  are expressed  in 
units  that deprive  them of direct  comparability  with EDT. The utility of making  Et the 
same in the two samples is now seen to be that it forces EDT to be the same in the 
Detroit  and national  samples. 
The tabulation  below  gives  a hypothetical  example  of the adjustment  procedure.  Both 
the nation  and Detroit  are assumed  to have equal  numbers  of spells of insured  and unin- 
sured  unemployment,  so that the simple  average  of ED, and EDN must equal  EDT. It is Stephen  T. Marston  25 
The Increase  in Unemployment  Duration  Attributable 
to Unemployment  Insurance 
The models  presented  in the appendixes  provide  an overall  estimate  of 
expected  duration  for insured  unemployment  and  values  of expected  dura- 
tion for total unemployment,  for twelve demographic  groups.  The esti- 
mated  duration  for insured  unemployment  is 5.62 weeks with a standard 
error  of 0.314 week,  while  the expected  duration  of total unemployment, 
aggregated  from the twelve values with weights corresponding  to each 
group's  share  of insured  unemployment,29  is 5.00 weeks with a standard 
also assumed  that unemployment  insurance  has an effect such that ED, is twice  EDN, 
although  this fact is unknown  before estimates  are made. The first  estimate  yields EDT 
of 6 weeks  from the U.S. sample  and labor market  "tightness,"  E, of 0.6. Suppose  next 
that  ED, is estimated  at 10 weeks  from the Detroit sample  with an E of 0.75. If ED, and 
EDT are incorrectly  thought to come from economies with similar total labor market 
conditions  and therefore  to be comparable,  EDN will be-from  (10 +  EDN)/2  = 6- 
2 weeks,  giving  an apparent  increase  in duration  due to unemployment  insurance  of 400 
percent,  rather  than the correct  value of 100 percent.  The error  lies in allowing  E to be 
different  in the two samples,  so that EDT is different.  Suppose,  instead,  that an equation 
of the form ED,  = aE is estimated  from Detroit data, and a is estimated  to be 13.33. 
Then  an E of 0.6 is substituted,  giving  an estimated  ED, of 8 weeks  for a labor market  of 
tightness  comparable  to that of the observed  U.S. market  with its EDT of 6 weeks.  Then, 
from (8 +  EDN)/2 = 6, EDN is calculated  as 4 weeks. This method correctly  gives an 
expected  increase  in duration  of 100 percent  due to unemployment  insurance. 
Expected duration 
of unemployment (weeks) 
Insured  Uninsured  Total 
Description  unem-  uniem-  unem-  Labor market 
of original  ployment  ploymentt  ployment  tightniess 
sample  EDi  EDN  EDT  E 
United States, totala  8b  4b  6a  0.  60a 
Detroita  loa  5b  7.5b  0. 75ac 
Detroitd  8d  4d  6d  0.60e 
Notes: a.  Observed. b. Unobserved. c.  Not  comparable to United States. d. Calculated. e. Assumed; 
comparable  to United States. 
29. The correct  weights  for aggregating  durations  of unemployment  are the shares  of 
spells  of unemployment  in each group.  This is equivalent  to aggregating  the reciprocals 
of durations  by group  shares  of unemployment.  The importance  of weighting  durations 
by insured  proportions  can be appreciated  by comparing  the expected  duration  of total 
unemployment  aggregated  with insured  weights, above, with the expected duration  of 
total unemployment  aggregated  with total weights,  4.40 weeks. If the demographic  dis- 
aggregation  had not been done, the difference  between these two would have been 
attributed  to the influence  of unemployment  insurance  rather than to  demographic 
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error  of 0.063  week  (see  table  1). The duration  for the uninsured  must  also 
be less than  that for the insured. 
The durations  for individual  groups  permit  more precise  comparisons. 
The  following  table  presents  the basic  identity  of static  equilibrium:  unem- 
ployment,  U, for any group  is equal  to its number  of spells of unemploy- 
Insured status 
Demographic  Uninsured  Insured 
group  N  I  Total 
1  Ut_ -  U>  (4= 
(SlN)(EDlN)  (S11)(ED11)  (St)(EDO) 
2  Ut N  U21  U2= 
(S2NX)(ED2N)  (S21)(ED21)  (St)(ED2) 
12  U12,N  =  (12,  1=2 
(S12,N)(ED12,AN)  (S12,1)(ED12,I)  (SlYED12) 
Total  Ut  =  U>  U 
(SNt)(EDt )(St)(E)  (t)(EDV) 
ment, S, multiplied  by its expected  duration,  ED.  Twenty-four  groups  are 
identified,  the insured  and  uninsured  subgroups  of the twelve  demographic 
groups.  The variables  marked  with  an asterisk  are observed  directly,  those 
with a circumflex  are estimated  from unemployment  models, and those 
with a dagger  are easily  calculated  from  the other  variables.  The numbers 
are  expressed  as fractions  of total unemployment:  U =  1 by definition;  U, 
is the fraction  of unemployment  in demographic  group  i in 1969,  calculated 
from  data  provided  by BLS;  U. is the fraction  of insured  workers  labeled  F 
in equations  (12)  and  (13)  below; Ui1 is the  fraction  of unemployed  workers 
insured  in group  i, calculated  from  data  provided  by the  Michigan  Employ- 
ment  Security  Commission.  Both  the numbers  of spells  and  the numbers  of 
unemployed  sum vertically  and horizontally.  For example, 
12 
(1)  E  Sir  sr 
i=1 
is the vertical  sum of insured  spells,  and 
(2)  SiN  +  Sip  U  to  i  po,  t  ..  v  12 
is the horizontal sum of spells. Up to this point, the important variables Stephen  T. Marston  27 
Table 1. The Expected Duration of Unemployment  for Selected 
Groups  in 1969 
Weeks 
Expected 
duration  of 
unemployment  Standard 
Group  ED  error 
Insured  unemployed,  by maximuim  period  of beniefits 
26 weeks  5.62  0.314 
39 weeks  6.02  0.312 
52 weeks  6.38  0.484 
65 weeks  6.57  0.484 
Total  unemployed 
Age-sex composition  of total  unemployed  4.40  0.047 
Age-sex composition  adjusted to that of insured 
unemployed  5.00  0.063 
Sources: Unemployment models described in appendixes A and B. The sources of the basic data are 
given in the section above, "Comparison of Expected Durations for the Insured and All Unemployed." 
EDiN and  ED I, whose  comparison  is necessary  for  evaluating  the  impact  of 
unemployment  insurance  on job search,  remain  unknown.  However,  since 
all of the UiN and Uir are known, only the Siv  and Si.  are required  to calcu- 
late the EDiN  and EDiI. Equations  (1) and (2) represent  thirteen  linear 
equations  in the twenty-four  unknowns  SiN  and Sir. Insufficient  informa- 
tion exists  to distinguish  the separate  incentive  effects  in each  demographic 
group,  so I require  that unemployment  insurance  cause  a proportional  in- 
crease  in duration  in each group.  A new variable,  P, is defined  as the con- 
stant  ratio  of insured  to uninsured  durations: 
(3)  p_  EDir  =  S_vi,d  i=  1,...,  12, 
EDiN  -Sir 
where 
(4)  d -  ui,  i-  1,....  12. 
iN 
Equation  (3) supplies  twelve  linear  equations  in the unknowns  Sir and  SiN 
and requires  only one new unknown,  P. With twenty-five  equations  in 
twenty-five  unknowns,  it is possible  to solve for every  variable  in the text 
table  on page 14. Substitution  gives one equation  in the unknown,  P, 
12  d.S, 
(5)  2PFtdSI=O, 
the root of which  is calculated  numerically. 28  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
This computation  can be clarified  by a simple  example,  laid out in the 
table  below.  Take  a hypothetical  world  with  only  two demographic  groups: 
young  and  old. Each  group  contains  some  insured  and  some  uninsured  un- 
employed  workers,  and  the former  remain  unemployed  twice  as long as the 
latter.  That  insurance  was the source  of the difference  would  be obvious  if 
the duration  in each of the cells could be observed;  however,  from the 
totals  it is unclear  whether  the expected  duration  for insured  workers  (9.6 
weeks)  exceeds  that of uninsured  workers  (4.2 weeks)  because  the insured 
are older  or because  they have a different  job-search  strategy. 
Not insured  Insured 
Group  N  I  Total 
U  S  ED  U  S  ED  U  S  ED 
Young  160 = 40  4  80 =  10  8  240 =  50  4.8 
(Y) 
Old  50 =  10  5  400 = 40  10  450 =  50  9 
(0) 
Total  210 =50 * 4.2  480 = 50  9.6  690 =  100  * 6.9 
From equation (4), 
(4')  ~~~~~~~~~01  (4 )  dy =  160  2 
400 
do=  850 
Substituting  into equation  (5), 
(5')  <  +p8(+0  8(50)  50  0.  1  +I  P  +  8  50  . 
This equation  is easily  solved  to give  P  2.0, implying  the correct  answer 
that  insured  workers  remain  unemployed  twice  as  long  as  uninsured  workers 
in the hypothetical  world. 
In the real world the estimated  value, P, is a random  variable,  since 
-i(=  Ui/lib)  and 9,(=  UE/KbD) are random  variables,  giving  P a stan- 
dard  error  of estimate,  which  is also calculated  numerically.30  The param- 
30. Si and SI were assumed to have normal distributions  of estimated mean and 
variance. Five hundred  values were drawn from these distributions  and P calculated 
from (5) in each case. The dispersion  of P was assumed to be its variance. All other 
standard  deviations  in this paper are calculated  from first-order  Taylor series approxi- 
mations. Stephen T. Marston  29 
eter  P is estimated  at 1.314,  with a standard  error  of 0.199. This is inter- 
preted  to mean  that the expected  duration  for the insured  is 31.4 percent 
greater  than that for the uninsured  in each demographic  group.  The in- 
crease  is larger  than  the standard  error  of the increase,  but not quite  twice 
as large,  giving  significance  to the increase  at not quite  the 5 percent  level. 
Table  2 presents  the expected  durations  for the individual  demographic 
groups,  each  separated  into an uninsured  and an insured  subgroup.  They 
are  calculated  from 
(6)  DiI-  dP  d  U 
and 
(7)  DiN=  D', 
both of which  are  easily  derived  from equations  (2) and (3). The total ex- 
pected  duration  for each group  is closer  to that for the insured  the larger 
the fraction  of total unemployment  accounted  for by the insured. 
All of the above estimates  are made under  the assumption  that unem- 
ployment  insurance  causes  the same  percentage  increase  in expected  dura- 
tion  in each  demographic  group.  But  perhaps  the incentive  effects  of unem- 
ployment  insurance  are more powerful  for secondary  workers  than for 
primary  workers,  who are obligated  by custom  and family  position  to find 
a  job as quickly  as possible.31  If so, expected  duration  would  increase  more 
in demographic  groups  with  more  secondary  workers.  To test this alterna- 
tive assumption,  I have allowed  the percentage  increases  in duration  to 
differ  by group.  Defining  Pi as the percentage  increase  of duration  in each 
group (=  EDir/EDiv),  I specify that 
(8)  Pi=  KiP, 
and choose  values of Ki that are larger  for groups  with more secondary 
workers;  P becomes  the weighted  average  increase  of all groups,  and  Ki the 
constant  of proportionality  that separates  each group  from  the average.32 
31. Some empirical  support  for this hypothesis  is provided  by Lininger, Unemploy- 
ment Benefits and Duration, p. 59. 
32. If the Ki are chosen so that 
E(f/lKi)  =  1, 
wherefi is the fraction  of insured  unemployment  in group i, 
Efi=  1, 
then P, the root of equation  (5), is automatically  the weighted  average  of Pi. 30  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
Table 2.  Expected Duration of Unemployment  by Age, Sex, and Insurance 
Status, 1969 
Weeks 
Age group  Uninsured  Insured  Total 
(years)  EDwN  ED1i  EDi 
Male 
16-24  3.74  4.92  3.90 
(0.75)  (0.65)  (0.08) 
25-34  3.81  5.01  4.91 
(0.60)  (0.20)  (0.19) 
35-44  4.34  5.71  5.52 
(0.69)  (0.28)  (0.25) 
45-54  5.87  7.72  7.39 
(0.93)  (0.38)  (0.31) 
55-64  5.66  7.44  6.93 
(0.93)  (0.49)  (0.34) 
65and over  5.98  7.86  7.41 
(1.06)  (0.73)  (0.64) 
Female 
16-24  3.74  4.92  3.85 
(0.77)  (0.68)  (0.08) 
25-34  3.46  4.55  3.84 
(0.64)  (0.48)  (0.14) 
35-44  3.90  5.13  4.37 
(0.71)  (0.53)  (0.19) 
45-54  4.05  5.32  4.73 
(0.70)  (0.44)  (0.22) 
55-64  5.65  7.43  6.48 
(1.03)  (0.76)  (0.41) 
65 and over  5.84  7.68  6.85 
(1.18)  (1.03)  (0.79) 
Sources: Column 1, equation (7), and column 2, equation (6), discussed in the text; column 3 is from the 
model described  in appendix A. The sources of the basic data are those given in the section above, "Com- 
parison  of Expected  Durations for the Insured  and All Unemployed"; information provided  by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics; and information from the Michigan Employment Security Commission. The numbers in 
parentheses  are standard errors of estimate. 
Estimation  is almost  identical  to that above,  except  that  Pi takes  the place 
of P in equation  (3) and consequently  di becomes 
(9)  diU=  ui. 
UiN 
Three  sets  of Ki  have  been  chosen,  identifying  different  groups  as secondary 
workers:  in the first  set women  are classified  as secondary  workers;  in the 
second,  youth;  and in the third,  both women  and youth.  In all cases the 
secondary  workers  are assumed  to have an increase  in expected  duration, Stephen  T. Marston  31 
Table  3. Measures  of Increase  in Expected  Duration  of Unemployment 
Attributable  to Unemployment  Insurance,  1969 
Ratio of expected 
duration  of insured  to 
Group  assumed  to be  uninsured  workersb  Stantdard  error 
secondary  workersa  P  of P 
None  1.314  0.199 
Women  1.215  0.187 
Youth"  1.220  0.197 
Women  and youth  1.157  0.185 
Source: Derived as explained in accompanying text. 
a. Secondary  workers, s, in each group, i, are assumed to have an increase,  Pi, in expected duration, ED, 
37 percent larger than the percent increase in ED for primary workers, p: P,/Pp  = 1.37. 
b. In the last three rows, the ratio Pi differs by demographic  group, i, so a weighted average is presented. 
c.  Aged 16 to 24. 
Pi, 37 percent  larger  than  the percent  increase  in that for primary  workers; 
that is, 
(10)  P  =  1.37P1, 
where  P8 and  P,  are duration  ratios for secondary  and primary  workers, 
respectively.  This 37 percent  difference  is the largest  that can be assumed 
without  causing  duration  for the insured  to be shorter  than  that  for the un- 
insured  in primary  demographic  groups. 
Table  3 presents  the estimated  P under  each  of the above  assumptions,  as 
well as under  the original  assumption  of equal  increases  in expected  dura- 
tion  for  each  demographic  group.  The  new  assumptions  lower  the weighted 
average,  P, as compared  with  P estimated  under  the original  assumption, 
because  they  attribute  more of the increase  in expected  duration  to demo- 
graphic  groups  containing  a smaller  fraction  of the insured  unemployed.  In 
the  last  case  unemployment  insurance  would  lengthen  expected  duration  by 
only 15.7  percent  instead  of 31.4 percent.  This assumption  is an extreme 
case,  which  gives  a lower  bound  for  P. Expected  duration  can safely  be as- 
sumed  to increase  between 15.7 percent  and 31.4 percent  as a result of 
unemployment  insurance. 
The  apparent  conclusion  from  this table  is that duration  for the insured 
is longer  than  that for the uninsured,  but not much.33 
Moreover,  not all of this  increase  is due  to the  first  lengthening  effect  that 
33. This conclusion agrees with Lininger's  findings that unemployment  insurance 
lengthens  duration  for only a small part of the labor force; see Untemployment  Benefits 
and  Duration,  p. 59. 32  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
unemployment  insurance  has on duration  of unemployment-the effect 
that  arises  because  an insured  worker  feels less pressure  to take a new  job 
quickly.  A significant  part  of the estimated  15.7  to 31.4  percent  lengthening 
of expected  duration  is attributable  to the reduction,  promoted  by unem- 
ployment  insurance,  in the  number  of departures  from  the labor  force.  This 
closer  attachment  to the labor  force  is explored  below. 
A further  caveat  on this  estimate  concerns  other  possible  biases  between 
the sample  of insured  and  total unemployment.  Probably  the most impor- 
tant  is attributable  to the  higher  proportion  ofjob losers  among  the insured 
unemployed  than among all the unemployed.  Because  job losers have a 
longer  expected  duration  of unemployment  than do job leavers,  new en- 
trants,  or reentrants,34  some of the longer duration  of the insured,  com- 
pared  with  the uninsured,  is due  to the reason  for  their  unemployment,  not 
to unemployment  insurance  itself. The estimated  increase  becomes an 
upper  limit;  this reinforces  the conclusion  that  the effect  of unemployment 
insurance  on duration  is small. 
The  Increase  in Unemployment  Due to Unemployment  Insurance 
How much  unemployment  results  from  the longer  expected  duration  es- 
timated  in the previous  section?  The answer  to this question  cannot  come 
entirely  from  the information  gathered  so far,rbecause  it depends  upon  the 
entire  workings  of the economy,  especially  the price  elasticity  of the aggre- 
gate  demand  for labor.  If unemployment  insurance  were  abolished,  unem- 
ployed workers  could not be as choosy in searching  for jobs; but if the 
number  of job vacancies  did not rise,  they could succeed  in obtaining  em- 
ployment  sooner only by squeezing  the formerly  uninsured  out of job 
opportunities.  Thus,  the expected  duration  for the formerly  insured  might 
fall at the cost of longer  duration  for the formerly  uninsured.  Another  pos- 
sibility  is that  the number  of layoffs,  and  hence  of spells  of unemployment, 
might  increase  because  employers  could hire workers  more easily.  In any 
case, the Phillips  curve  would shift toward  the origin;  whether  the result 
would be less unemployment  or less wage inflation  would depend  upon 
34. Calculations from data in Employment  and Earnings,  vol. 16 (January 1970), 
Table A13, p. 25, indicate  that the expected  duration  for job losers is greater  than that 
for other  unemployed.  Some of this increase,  of course, is due to the higher  proportion 
of insured  workers  among the job losers. Also, the difference  between  the duration of 
job losers and job leavers  may trace  partly  to their demographic  differences. Stephen T. Marston  33 
Table 4.  Unemployment  Rates under  Alternative  Unemployment  Insurance 
Systems, 1969 
Change  in 
Unemploymenit  Untemploymenit  unemployment  rate 
insuran2ce  rate  Stan2dard  from actual 
system  (percent)  error  (percentage  points) 
Actual (26 weeks of benefits)  3.5  ...  ... 
No UI; P =  1.314a  3.16  0.164  -0.34 
No  UI; P  =  1.157a  3.31  0.197  -0.19 
39 weeks  of benefits  3.60  0.117  0.10 
52 weeks  of benefits  3.69  0.153  0.19 
65 weeks  of benefits  3.74  0.155  0.24 
Sources: Actual-official  U.S.  unemployment rate for  1969, from Economic Report of  the President 
February  1975, p. 276; other-calculated  from table 3, above, and equations (12) and (13) discussed in the 
text. 
a.  For definition of P, see table 3. 
factors  beyond  the scope  of this  paper,  including  the stabilization  policy  of 
the government. 
In calculating  the  lessening  in unemployment  from  the  elimination  of un- 
employment  insurance,  I assume  (1) that  the number  of spells  of unemploy- 
ient  does not change and (2) that the expected  duration  of uninsured 
workers  does not change.  These  assumptions  correspond  to a very  elastic 
aggregate  demand  for labor.  The only thing  that changes  is that all unem- 
ployed  workers  become  uninsured,  so that everyone  remains  unemployed 
EDN  weeks.  The  amount  of unemployment  among  formerly  insured  workers 
decreases  by the divisor  P, the proportion  calculated  for the weighted 
average  of expected  duration: 
( 11  )  UN =  Ul/P. 
The  superscript  on U  denotes  unemployment  after  unemployment  insurance 
has been abolished.  Since  unemployment  in the uninsured  sector  remains 
the same,  total unemployment  becomes 
(12)  UN =  UN  +  U=U(1  F +  ), 
where  U is unemployment  with  the insurance  system  in effect  and F is the 
fraction  of unemployed  workers  who are  insured.  In 1969,  F was 40.8 per- 
cent,35  giving  the values  of UN  in the second  and  third  rows  of table  4. The 
unemployment  rate  in 1969 would  have been between  0.19 and 0.34 per- 
35. This number  includes  unemployment  insurance  programs  for veterans  and fed- 
eral employees  as well as state programs. 34  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
centage  point  lower  had  unemployment  insurance  not existed.  These  figures 
fall short  of the 0.75  percentage  point  that was Feldstein's  minimum  guess 
for the decrease  in the unemployment  rate of 1971  that might  come from 
reducing  the duration  of unemployment  by improving  the unemployment 
insurance  system.36 
Extended  Benefits 
During  periods  of high  unemployment  a system  of federal  extended  bene- 
fits automatically  lengthens  the period  of benefits  by 13  weeks.  As of Janu- 
ary 1, 1975,  13 further  weeks  of benefits  were  added  (temporarily),  raising 
the maximum  duration  to 52 weeks  in most states;  the 1975  tax reduction 
law  added  still  another  13  weeks,  bringing  the  maximum  to 65 weeks.  What 
is the impact  on unemployment  of these  extensions  in benefits? 
To estimate  the rise in unemployment,  I assume  that the continuation 
rates for the insured,  estimated  using  the model of appendix  B, can be ex- 
trapolated  beyond  26 weeks  to the new duration  with  the functional  form 
estimated  over  the shorter  period.  Further,  I assume  that the continuation 
rate for the insured,  rather  than dropping  back to that for the uninsured 
after  26 weeks,  remains  at its previous  level through  the maximum  benefit 
period.  In other words,  the escape  rate for the insured  does not rise to 
match  that  for the uninsured  after  26 weeks,  but remains  at its own,  lower, 
level through  39, 52, or 65 weeks. 
Tables  1 and  4 present  the results.  Under  a 39-week  system,  the expected 
duration  of insured  unemployment  would  increase  to 6.02  weeks.  Assuming 
that the proportion  of spells  of unemployment  that were  insured  was the 
same  as that  in 1969,  this  increase  would  raise  the total  unemployment  rate 
to 3.60 percent.37 
36. Lowering  the  Permanent  Rate of Unemployment,  p. 48. Note that Feldstein's  guess 
applies to 1971, rather  than 1969. However, the impact on employment  would be no 
more in 1971 than in 1969 for reasons discussed  below in the section on looser labor 
markets. 
37. The mathematical  formulation  is 
(13)  U+ =  FED  +  (1-FF)]  U+, 
where U+  and ED+ are the unemployment  rate and expected  duration  of insured  unem- 
ployment for the extended  system; ED+ is calculated  from equation (B-il)  under the 
new assumptions  about continuation  rates. Stephen T. Marston  35 
Similarly,  for a 52-week  system  the expected  duration  of insured  unem- 
ployment  may increase  to 6.38 weeks,  raising  the unemployment  rate to 
3.69 percent;  a 65-week  system  would  increase  ED, to 6.57 weeks,  raising 
the unemployment  rate to 3.74 percent.  These  increases  are also modest, 
and  indicate  that  the  present  extended  benefits  do not seriously  threaten  an 
increase  in the unemployment  rate. 
The  Impact  of Unemployment  Insurance  in Looser  Labor  Markets 
All of the results  derived  so far are  predicated  upon the extremely  tight 
labor  market  of 1969.  Four  factors  made  1969  a logical  choice  for analysis. 
First  of all, 1969  was a peak  year  of economic  activity  during  which  unem- 
ployment  was neither  rising  nor falling.  This static  condition  is necessary 
for the statistical  method of appendix  A to be precisely  correct.  Second, 
labor  demand  was  at such  a high  level  in 1969  that  the increase  in the offer- 
ing of labor consequent  upon the abolition  of unemployment  insurance 
would  probably  have been absorbed.  Thus, the "experiment"  reported  in 
table  4 makes  more  sense, and the calculated  decreases  in the unemploy- 
ment  rate  are  more  accurate,  for 1969  than  any  other  recent  year.  Third,  the 
nation  came  very  close to the "permanent  rate  of unemployment"  in 1969, 
so comparisons  with Feldstein  are  more  meaningful.  Finally,  the data are 
available  for 1969. 
Unfortunately,  the  labor  market  of 1975,  when  the unemployment  rate  is 
forecast  at about  8.8  percent,  is far  removed  from  the  labor  market  of 1969. 
This section discusses  the likely role of unemployment  insurance  in the 
current  recession. 
In general,  a looser labor  market  will be associated  with a smaller  "re- 
employment"  effect from unemployment  insurance  and a larger "labor 
force  participation"  effect.  Any worker  who made himself  more readily 
available  because  unemployment  insurance  was eliminated  would be less 
likely  to find vacancies  and employment  in a looser labor market.  And 
those  workers  who were  able  to shorten  their  unemployment  would  do so 
probably  by  displacing  other  workers.  But  more  workers  would  stop  search- 
ing for work  in discouragement  if it were  not for their  weekly  visit to the 
Employment  Service.  In a loose labor  market,  then, unemployment  insur- 
ance  has  less  reemployment  effect  than  it does  in a tight  one, but  more  par- 
ticipation  effect.  Even if these  two shifts  in effect  balanced  each other,  so 36  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
that the impact  on unemployment  were similar  in loose and tight labor 
markets,  less employment  (and  income)  would  be lost in loose labor  mar- 
kets with  unemployment  insurance  operating,  because  more of its impact 
would  be concentrated  on labor  force  participation  than on employment. 
Both  the  coverage  and  duration  of unemployment  benefits  have  been  ex- 
tended  since  1969.  The  system  automatically  expands  to cover  a larger  frac- 
tion of unemployment  during  a recession,  because  of the larger  proportion 
of job losers  at such times.  In February  1975,  72.3 percent  of the unem- 
ployed  were  insured,  compared  with  40.8 percent  in 1969.38  Together  with 
the extension  of the benefit  period  from  26 to 65 weeks,  this increase  sug- 
gests a larger  impact  of unemployment  insurance  in 1975 than in 1969, 
other  things  equal. 
The "automatic  stabilizing"  effects  of unemployment  insurance  cannot 
be neglected  in the 1975  recession.  With aggregate  demand  for goods and 
services  falling  away  to an extent  unforeseen  by planners,  this  feature  of the 
system,  whereby,  during  a recession,  expenditures  for benefits increase 
more  rapidly  than  the  payroll  taxes  that  support  them,  probably  outweighed 
the adverse  effects  of the system  on duration.  Without  unemployment  in- 
surance,  total  expenditures,  and  hence  employment,  would  have  fallen  even 
further  than  they  have in 1975. 
In a world  of feeble  labor demand  and limited  job vacancies,  the infla- 
tionary  impact  of unemployment  insurance  seems more relevant  than its 
unemployment  impact.  The  system  imparts  an inflationary  bias  to the  labor 
market  aside  from  the automatic  increase  in government  expenditures  that 
it causes.  If unemployment  insurance  did not exist  to provide  income  sup- 
port  to the unemployed,  a given amount  of unemployment  would  have a 
greater  downward  pressure  on wages  than now obtains,  because  workers 
would  be more  inclined  to accept  low-paying  jobs. This  tendency  is not an 
additional  effect  of the system,  but  the upward-rightward  shift  of the short- 
run  Phillips  curve  viewed  from  the perspective  of inflation.  In 1975  the im- 
pact  of unemployment  insurance  is probably  manifested  in less  deceleration 
in wages  and prices  than would  have been achieved  in its absence,  rather 
than  in a big increase  in unemployment. 
38. These percentages  include programs  for veterans and federal employees, and 
extended  benefits,  as well as state programs.  Employmenzt  and  Earnings,  vol. 21 (March 
1975),  p. 124, gives data for state unemployment  insurance.  Data for the other groups 
were  gathered  directly  from the U.S. Unemployment  Insurance  Service. Stephen T. Marston  37 
All of these  differences  between  1969 and 1975  preclude  a quantitative 
estimate  of the impact  of unemployment  insurance  in 1975.  Although  the 
extended  benefits  and  greater  coverage  are  not difficult  to fit into the analy- 
sis of the previous  sections,  other changes  in the labor market  make it 
hazardous  to extrapolate  the results  of 1969  to 1975.  Further  research  will 
be required  to evaluate  the quantitative  importance  of unemployment  in- 
surance  in weak  labor  markets. 
Job Search  and  Benefit  Exhaustion 
In order  to develop  another  view of the impact  of unemployment  insur- 
ance  on job search  in a way that avoids  the sampling  problems  associated 
with  the differences  between  the insured  and  uninsured  unemployed,  I now 
compare  the labor market  behavior  of insured  workers  before  and after 
they exhaust  their  benefits.  "Post-exhaustion"  studies  are conducted  by a 
number  of state  employment  agencies,  mostly  to determine  the adequacy  of 
the benefit  period.  As such  they  are  not perfectly  suited  to studying  the in- 
centive  effects  of unemployment  insurance.  However,  they  do provide  data 
for calculating  continuation  rates  and  even  reemployment  rates  of workers 
whose  benefits  have  run  out-so-called "exhaustees."  The  data  are  collected 
in a household  survey  of exhaustees,  determining  their  labor  market  status 
in the months  after  exhaustion. 
Unfortunately,  Michigan  did not conduct  this kind of survey,  so that a 
precise  comparison  between  pre-  and  post-exhaustion  continuation  rates  is 
not available.  Of the states  that  do conduct  such  surveys,  Pennsylvania  has 
the most nearly comparable  sample.39  In addition, the Michigan  pre- 
exhaustion  continuation  rates  are  adjusted  to reflect  the unemployment  rate 
and  labor  turnover  rates  prevailing  in Pennsylvania  during  the  survey  years, 
1966  and 1967.40  The monthly  continuation  rates of the post-exhaustion 
study  are  reported  in weekly  terms  to achieve  comparability  with the pre- 
39. Commonwealth  of Pennsylvania,  Department  of Labor and Industry,  Bureau  of 
Employment  Security,  "Labor Force and Claim Status of Workers  during the Twelve 
Months Following  Exhaustion  of Unemployment  Compensation  Benefits  in Pennsyl- 
vania, 1966-1967"  (no date; processed). 
40. The unemployment  rate is set at 3.4 percent  and the accession  rate at 3.5 percent; 
both are 1966-67  averages.  Thus, in equation  (B-9)  E is set at 1.03; D, of course,  is set at 
zero. 38  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
exhaustion  rates.4'  The  point  of exhaustion  is assumed  to occur  at the  aver- 
age  duration  of benefits  of exhaustees  in Pennsylvania  in 1966  and 1967. 
If these adjustments  achieve  comparability  between  the two samples, 
figure  2 can be viewed  as a record  of the continuation  rates  of a cohort  of 
unemployed  workers  who file their  initial  claims  for unemployment  insur- 
ance  in week  zero  and  exhaust  their  benefits  after  27.3  weeks.  Each  point  on 
the  curve  r, represents  the  fraction  of unemployed  workers  who  will  remain 
unemployed  at least  one  more  week.  The  figure  shows  the  normal  rapid  rise 
in insured  continuation  rates  during  the pre-exhaustion  period.  After ex- 
haustion,  continuation  rates fall precipitously;  equivalently,  escape  rates 
rise dramatically  from 1.1 percent  just before  exhaustion  to 13.4 percent 
just afterward.  The  new  escape  rate  is divided  about  equally  between  reem- 
ployment  (6.9 percent)  and departures  from  the labor  force  (6.5 percent). 
Beyond  the  first  month  after  exhaustion  the escape  rate  approaches  its pre- 
exhaustion  level, although  it is still a few percentage  points  lower  than its 
level extrapolated  from  pre-exhaustion  rates.  In this third  period,  workers 
escape  unemployment  primarily  by finding  jobs rather  than  by leaving  the 
labor  force. 
This  is precisely  the behavior  to be expected  if unemployment  insurance 
does  work  some  effect  during  the insured  weeks,  both against  employment 
and  in favor  of remaining  in the labor  force.42  After  payments  are cut off, 
some workers  take  jobs they would  have rejected  or failed  to find before 
that. The steep  increase  in reemployment  after  exhaustion,  followed  by a 
renewed  decline  beyond  the following  month,  probably  indicates  that  some 
workers  took  jobs that  became  acceptable  only after  their  benefits  ran out. 
This  tendency  creates  the abnormal  bunching  of job matches  immediately 
after  exhaustion.  The similar  time pattern  in withdrawals  from the labor 
force  probably  indicates  that some  workers  who would  have  left the labor 
force held out until their benefits  were exhausted.  This may be only a 
semantic  distinction:  the recipients  may actually  have given  up job search 
before  that  time,  while  maintaining  a pretense  for employment  counselors. 
This  pre-  and  post-exhaustion  comparison  offers  very  strong  evidence  of 
incentives  from  unemployment  insurance,  but little help in judging  their 
magnitude.  First, as curve  b, in figure  2 indicates,  after 27.3 weeks only 
41. The monthly  rates have been raised  to the power 1/4.3. 
42. My discussion  of these points benefits  from Merrill  G. Murray,  The  Duration  of 
Unemployment  Benefits  (Kalamazoo:  Upjohn  Institute  for Employment  Research,  1974), 
p. 23. Stephen  T. Marston  39 
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about  6 percent  of the original  cohort  are still unemployed,  a very small, 
and  not necessarily  representative,  sample.  Second,  the first  month  after  ex- 
haustion  contains  an abnormal  bunching  of exits  from  unemployment.  The 
later  continuation  rates  more nearly  reflect  the labor market  behavior  of 
uninsured  unemployed  workers.  There  are  so few data  points  in that  range 
of duration,  however,  that  I have  resisted  an inclination  to fit some curve 
through  them  in order  to derive  an estimate  of impact.  The strongest  con- 
clusion  that can be justified  from  the post-exhaustion  study  is that unem- 
ployment insurance does indeed significantly  extend unemployment, 
through  its effects  on both reemployment  and  labor  force  participation. 
Conclusion 
This  paper  provides  an empirical  study  of an important  policy  question 
in manpower  economics-how much the government  exacerbates  unem- 
ployment  problems  through  the unemployment  insurance  system.  It intro- 
duces  new  econometric  methods  to establish  the extent  to which  the system 
encourages  longer  unemployment.  In particular,  it clarifies  the meaning  of 
"average  duration  of unemployment,"  a concept  that has been abused  in 
previous  studies,  and sets out methods  for calculating  a better  mean  dura- 
tion  from  administrative  data.  The  expected  duration  of unemployment  for 
insured  workers  is found to exceed  that of uninsured  workers,  to a sta- 
tistically  significant,  if relatively  small,  degree. 
The paper  also analyzes  for the first  time the behavior  of unemployed 
workers  as they exhaust their unemployment  insurance  benefits.  Some 
workers  appear  to "ride  along"  near  the end of the benefit  period  and to 
take  jobs only  after  their  benefits  have  been  cut off. This  represents  further 
evidence  for a statistically  significant,  but small,  work  disincentive  exerted 
by unemployment  insurance. 
The  implications  for  policy  are  fairly  clear:  neither  the boosters  of unem- 
ployment  insurance,  who deny that it offers  any disincentive,  nor the at- 
tackers,  who  blame  it for a large  amount  of unemployment,  are  persuasive. 
Although  the  study  demonstrates  that  the  existing  system  causes  a percepti- 
ble,  but  small,  amount  of unemployment  in the  United  States-between  0.2 
and  0.3 percent  of the  labor  force-that is not a figure  that  supports  the  no- 
tion of armies  of unemployed  malingerers  and chiselers. 
The advocates  of unemployment  insurance  quite  probably  could  justify Stephen T. Marston  41 
this  small  cost in terms  of income  redistribution  and the more  efficient  job 
matches  that  longer  searches  permit.  After  all,  the  value  of employment  is in 
producing  income;  and the improvement  in labor productivity  resulting 
from  better  job matches  will  partly  compensate  for the loss of income  due 
to longer  unemployment.  The welfare  ramifications  of the increases  in un- 
employment  induced  by  unemployment  insurance  are,  however,  beyond  the 
scope  of this paper. 
Among  the  various  forms  of income  support  for the unemployed,  unem- 
ployment  insurance  stands  out as the most successful  and  the least contro- 
versial.  The  experience-rating  method  of financing  the system  has helped  to 
make  it self-policing  and  relatively  free  of scandal.  The system  provides  in- 
come  support  with  dignity,  without  a humiliating  means  test.  It should  not 
now  be attacked  by exaggerated  claims  of work  disincentives.  If further  re- 
search  warrants  it, possibly  the "work  test"  should  be more  diligently  and 
firmly  administered,  or the experience-rating  system  perfected.  Otherwise, 
the unemployment  insurance  system can be left intact without severely 
prejudicing  the nation's  chances  for full employment. 
APPENDIX A 
Cross-Section  Modelfor Estimating 
Expected  Durations  of Unemployment 
ASSUME  a heterogeneous  labor supply.43  Job search  is conducted  in con- 
tinuous  time,  with  the escape  rate,  p, characterizing  a searcher's  chance  of 
leaving  unemployment.44  Variations  in acceptance  wages and personal 
characteristics  give unemployed  workers  different  escape  rates.  But a par- 
ticular  individual  is assumed  to have a fixed  escape  rate,  irrespective  of his 
43. This model was developed by Salant in "Search  Theory and Duration Data," 
although  it appears  to have some similarity  to a model of employment  developed by 
H. Silcock,  "The Phenomenon  of Labour Turnover,"  Journal  of the Royal Statistical 
Society,  vol. 117 (pt. 4, 1954),  pp. 429-40. 
44. The continuous-time  escape rate, p, in this cross-section  model is related to the 
discrete  continuation  rate,  r, in the time-series  model by the equation  e-P  =  r. The rate  p 
varies  between  zero and infinity  as r varies  between  1 and 0. 42  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
duration  of unemployment.  Assume  further  that escape  rates are distrib- 
uted  among  unemployed  workers  according  to a gamma  distribution:45 
(A-1)  dG(p) =  (b)p 
where  p > 0, a > 0, and b >  0 are  fixed  but unknown  parameters. 
Also, 
ao 
r(b)  fxb-  le  dx. 
From this expression  is derived  the distribution  of (1) the unobserved 
completed  spells  of unemployment,  and (2) the observed  incomplete  spells 
of unemployment.  The mean  of the distribution  of completed  spells  is the 
object  of this estimation  and it is found  to be given simply  by 
(A-2)  ED-b  ab 
The  parameters  a and  b must  be estimated  from  the data  on unemployment 
spells  by the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  from  its Current  Population  Sur- 
vey. The distribution  of incomplete  spells  is derived  using  the information 
that  the  probability  of being  included  in the household  sample  as an unem- 
ployed  worker  is proportional  to the duration  of unemployment.  The dis- 
tribution  turns  out to have the density 
(A-3)  g(T) =  (b -  1) ab-1  (a +  T)-b, 
where  T is the duration  of an interrupted  spell of unemployment.  Equation 
(A-3) can be integrated  over any time interval  (t1 < T <  t2) to find the 
number  of spells  caught  within  that interval  by the survey: 
(A-4)  N(tl,  t2) =  ft2g(T)  dT =  (  +  )-  (a  ) 
ti~  ~~  i  t 
The  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  collects  data  on the number  of unemployed 
workers  with  incomplete  spells  within  specified  intervals  (t1, t2), and  groups 
them  into categories  as follows:46 
45. The gamma  distribution  is arbitrary  but very convenient. 
46. The divisions  are halfway  between  the groups,  so that the boundaries  are 0, 4.5, 
6.5, and so forth. Stephen T. Marston  43 
Weeks  Weeks 
0-4  11-14 
5-6  15-26 
7-10  27-51 
More than 52 
A maximum-likelihood  method  was  used  to fit equation  (A-4)  to the data. 
This  method  provides  asymptotically  unbiased  estimates  of the parameters 
and  of the covariance  matrix  of the parameters.  The derivatives  of the log- 
likelihood  function  are  nonlinear  in the parameters,  so a numerical  search 
procedure  was  used  to find  the optimum  parameters,  a and  b. The last col- 
umn of table  2 presents  the estimated  expected  durations  computed  from 
equation  (A-2),  together  with their  asymptotic  standard  errors. 
This method  for estimating  expected  durations  from BLS data differs 
from  that used with unemployment  insurance  data because  the data sets 
differ  substantially.  However,  the two models are consistent  in their as- 
sumptions  about  unemployment.  The cross-section  model  makes  stronger 
assumptions  about  escape  rates  than does the time-series  model.  The first 
assumes  that  individual  escape  rates  are  constant,  with  heterogeneity  lead- 
ing to sorting  and  to falling  cohort  escape  rates.  The second  makes  no as- 
sumption  about  individual  escape  rates,  but assumes  exponentially  rising 
continuation  rates  for each cohort.  It can be shown  that the cross-section 
model  also implies  such exponentially  rising  rates. 
APPENDIX  B 
A Modelfor Estimating  Insured 
Continuation  Rates and Expected  Duration 
CONSIDER  the problem  of expressing  insured  unemployment  as a function 
of job layoffs  and recent  continuation  rates.47  Let t represent  the current 
week.  Suppose  S,-1 workers  began  insured  unemployment  spells  last week, 
47. Further  details  of this model can be found in Stephen  T. Marston, "An Econo- 
metric  Analysis  of the Unemployment  Insurance  System  in a Local Urban Labor Mar- 
ket" (Ph.D. dissertation,  University  of Michigan,  1974). 44  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
in most  cases  because  they  were  laid off  from  their  previous  jobs. The  num- 
ber  of workers  unemployed  this  week  who have  been  unemployed  just one 
week  is the  number  of the St1 workers  who  remain  unemployed  this  week: 
(B-1)  Ut'  =  rtl,S,.48 
Similarly,  the number  of workers  unemployed  j weeks  is equal  to the num- 
ber  laid offj weeks  ago who have remained  unemployed  during  all of the 
intervening  weeks: 
(B-2)  Ut i =  rt jrt_l'  *. . rt_i+1  lSt_ 
(B-3)  Ut  (  rtm  m)St-P 
where  rt-j,O  is defined  as 1. 
The  total  number  of insured  unemployed  workers  in the current  week  is 
the sum  of the number  of workers  still  unemployed  from  layoffs  in each of 
the  previous  weeks  up to the  26-week  maximum  duration  of unemployment 
insurance  benefits: 
26 
(B-4)  Ut =  EUt  i 
26  /i  \ 
(B-5)  Ut =  E  (A  rt_mij)St_i. 
Not all insured  workers  are eligible  for 26 weeks  of benefits.  With  6, de- 
fined  as the fraction  of initial  claimants  with a potential  period  of benefits 
of at least  j weeks, 
(B-6)  U  -  U 
represents  the  number  of insured  unemployed  workers  who are  still  eligible 
for benefits-that is, who  have  not yet exhausted  their  benefits.  Here, U*  is 
again  the sum of the insured  unemployed  with duration  up to 26 weeks. 
26  /i 
(B-7)  U*=  ai  rt_m, _)St-P 
This  equation  relates  the level of insured  unemployment  to the flow of job 
48. The first  subscript  on the continuation  rate, r, represents  the week of unemploy- 
ment  the cohort of workers  is passing through  with a probability  r, and the second sub- 
script  represents  how long they will be unemployed  at the completion  of that week. Stephen T. Marston  45 
losers.  It can  be estimated  if a functional  form  is specified  for the continua- 
tion  rates.  In view  of the  many  studies  that  have  been  made  of labor  market 
transition  rates,49  it is possible  to specify  a precise  form  that includes  be- 
forehand  the  known  information  about  continuation  rates.  The  probability 
of a worker  remaining  unemployed  during  the current  week  must  be a ran- 
dom function  of the length  of his unemployment  and the aggregate  excess 
demand  for labor: 
(B-8)  r=  al  -a2ea33  -  a4ea52Et +  a6D,  +  Et. 
In this equation,  al,..  , a6 are  fixed  but unknown  parameters,  the exog- 
enous variable  Et is a proxy for the excess demand  for labor,50  Dt is a 
dummy  variable  for the automobile  model  changeover  in Detroit,  and  Et is 
an independent,  identically  distributed  random  disturbance.  As can  be seen 
in figure  B-1,  the  form  allows  the  continuation  rate  to rise  (the  escape  rate  to 
fall)  the longer  a worker  has been unemployed,  but the rate  of increase  de- 
clines  so that  the  continuation  rate  stays  within  the acceptable  bounds  for a 
probability.51  Further,  the curve  shifts  down when  the demand  for labor 
rises,  and  up when  it falls.  The  three  curves  in figure  B-I are  drawn  for  three 
different  values  of E. In the terminology  of Markov  chains,  the probability 
of transition  from  unemployment  to employment  is nonstationary,  because 
it varies  with  the duration  of unemployment  and the demand  for labor. 
Equation  (B-8)  is substituted  into equation  (B-7),  expressing  U, as a non- 
linear function of the known variables  St and Et, and the parameters 
a1,  . . ., a6.  The  a3  are  taken  to be constants  and  estimated  directly  from  the 
Michigan  data on potential  duration.  The parameters  a,  ... .,  a6 are esti- 
mated  by a least-squares  algorithm,  which minimizes  the squared  error 
about  the dependent  variable,  Ut, over  the space  of allowable  parameters. 
The algorithm  allows for autocorrelation  of the residuals.  The estimated 
equation  for the continuation  rate, with standard  errors  in parentheses,  is 
49. George L. Perry, "Unemployment  Flows in the U.S. Labor Market," BPEA 
(2:1972), pp. 245-78; Kaitz, "Analyzing  the Length of Spells of Unemployment";  and 
Hall, "Turnover  in the Labor Force." 
50. Several  definitions  for Et have  been  discussed  and tested.  The best definition  is the 
total rate  of job accessions  divided  by the rate of unemployment;  see Marston,  "Econo- 
metric  Analysis  of the Unemployment  Insurance  System." 
51. Continuation  rates  rise  with duration  for several  reasons,  but the most important 
is the sorting  effect  upon  a heterogeneous  labor pool. The longer  a cohort of workers  has 
been unemployed,  the fewer  easily employable  workers  remain  in it and the smaller  the 
fraction  of the remaining  workers  who find  jobs during  a succeeding  week. 46  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
Figure  B-1. Insured  Continuation  Rates  Estimated  from  Insured 
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Source: Equation (B-8), discussed in the text. 
a.  E =  labor market tightness. 
(B-9)  rt  ,  =  1 -  0.282e- 0173i  _  0.116eC0 0984'Et +  0.146  Dt. 
(0. 128)(0.100)  (0.073)(0.109)  (0.065) 
R2 = 0.966, in terms  of the error  in predicting  Ut from equation  (B-7). 
The  method  uses  a priori  information  to minimize  the number  of param- 
eters that must be estimated from the data. Standard distributed-lag  mod- 
els, such as those of Almon or Koyck, make inappropriate assumptions 
about  the lag weights  and are  incapable  of incorporating  the special  inter- Stephen  T. Marston  47 
action  between  Et and  St. The  resulting  distributed-lag  model  with  variable 
weights  has been shown  to generate  accurate  forecasts  of insured  unem- 
ployment. 
Continuation  rates  can  be forecast  for  any  values  of the  independent  vari- 
ables  by substituting  them  into equation  (B-9).  In this paper  the values  of 
Et and Dt are  taken  as the values  appropriate  to the United States  in 1969 
to make the continuation  rates for the insured  unemployed  comparable 
with the continuation  rates for all the unemployed  calculated  from U.S. 
data  for 1969. 
The  variables  Ut  and St are  monthly  administrative  time  series  gathered 
in the Detroit  SMSA  over  the years  1966  through  1971.  The  first, Ut,  mea- 
sures  "continued  claims,"  the number  of workers  declaring  a week of un- 
employment  under  the unemployment  insurance  system;  St measures  "ini- 
tial claims,"  the number  of workers  declaring  a recent  layoff  from  insured 
unemployment. 
To calculate  expected  duration,  assume  all variables  are constant  over 
the  year  studied.  Then  equation  (B-5)  can  be written  in a steady-state  form: 
(B-10)  U =  HE  rl rS. 
The  expected  duration  of unemployment  is given  by the level of unemploy- 
ment divided  by the number  of spells  initiated  (and completed)  per week: 
(B-il)  ED  U=-  - 
S  j=O  m=O 
This  is the  mean  for  completed  spells  because  it represents  the total  number 
of weeks of unemployment  divided  by the number  of spells.  This ratio is 
needed  to deduce  the impact  of unemployment  insurance  on unemploy- 
ment.  Equation  (B-il) shows  that  ED is calculable  directly  from  continua- 
tion rates,  r. It is used  to calculate  expected  duration  for the insured,  ED,: 
The continuation  rates  for the insured  are substituted  up to the maximum 
26 weeks  and  the rates  for the uninsured  after  26 weeks,  when  benefits  have 
been  exhausted.52  An earlier  section  provides  evidence  that  a shift  in transi- 
tion rates  does  in fact  occur.  The only  remaining  task  is to add  a very  small 
period,  estimated  to be the  mean  delay  between  the onset  of unemployment 
52. After  26 weeks  no one is insured  (in 1969),  so the estimated  continuation  rates for 
all the uninsured  can be used  as the rates  for the uninsured.  These  are provided  by Kaitz, 
"Analyzing  the Length of Spells of Unemployment,"  p. 13. 48  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
and  the claiming  of benefits.  This  period  includes  the mean  delay  between 
separation  and initial  claim  both for claimants  who file immediately  and 
those  who  lag in filing.  Since  more  than  90 percent  of claimants  file  as soon 
as possible,  the aggregate  mean  is only 1.10  weeks.53 
53. William  H. Andrews,  "Time  Lapses  in Filing  Employment  Security  Benefit  Claims 
in Indiana,"  Prepared  for the Indiana  Employment  Security  Division and the U.S. De- 
partment  of Labor  (1958; processed). Comments  and 
Discussion 
Robert  E. Hall: This  is a careful,  thorough  study  of the issue  of duration  in 
the  insured  and  uninsured  groups  of unemployed.  I have  no criticism  of the 
calculations  themselves,  but I wonder  how much  can be learned  from  this 
comparison  between  the insured  and the uninsured.  Irrespective  of any 
technical  problems  in such  comparisons,  I think  Feldstein  may  have  done  a 
disservice  in focusing  on relative  duration  as a way of getting  at the issue 
of the incentive  effects  of unemployment  insurance.  Marston  has disposed 
of Feldstein's  original  estimates  quite effectively,  but I wonder  whether 
analysis  should  have taken  this approach  in the first  place. 
The approach  runs  into problems  because  it is extremely  difficult  to dis- 
entangle  the behavior  of the insured  from  the behavior  of job losers.  Basi- 
cally,  most  job losers  are insured,  while  very  few of the other  unemployed 
workers  are insured.  Inspecting  the data on continuation  rates  for people 
grouped  according  to the reason  for their  unemployment,  I find that the 
rates are much higher among job losers than among job leavers: the 
monthly  continuation  rate is roughly  0.75 for losers and about 0.5 for 
leavers.  Presumably,  Marston's  careful  adjustments  for the demographic 
composition  of unemployment  account  for  a big  part  of that  difference.  But 
setting  aside  the  demographic  problem,  the  higher  continuation  rates  of the 
job losers  imply  that,  for whatever  reason,  those  that  are  insured  take  much 
longer  to leave  unemployment  than those who are not. 
While  the paper  adjusts  for the demographic  composition,  it cannot  ad- 
just for this fundamental  fact that most of the insured  have  lost their  jobs 
while  most of the uninsured  have left their  jobs or just entered  the labor 
force.  Moreover,  the uninsured  unemployed  include  only a special  group 
ofjob leavers.  Many  job leavers  never  become  unemployed  at all, especially 
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in a tight  labor  market  like 1969.  Only  those  who fall into the "Perry  pot- 
hole" (as analyzed  in BPEA,  2:1972) appear  in the ranks of the unem- 
ployed. 
Marston  judges  that,  if anything,  this  comparison  of durations  overstates 
the  difference  caused  by unemployment  insurance,  because  job losers  would 
normally  have  longer  spells  of unemployment  aside  from  the effects  of un- 
employment  insurance.  But I can think of several  reasons  why  job losers 
might  have  shorter  spells  than  the other  unemployed,  so that  the measured 
difference  might understate  the true effects  of unemployment  insurance. 
First,  the  new  entrants  and  reentrants  have  less  information  about  the  labor 
market,  and  it would  be rational  for them  to look longer  because  they  have 
to gather  information  that laid-off  workers  already  have. Second,  many 
workers  who are laid off are ultimately  recalled  to their previous  jobs, 
which  means  that much  insured  unemployment  has fairly  short  duration. 
Furthermore,  knowing  that they can become  eligible  for unemployment 
benefits  after  a disqualification  period  may  lead  many  job leavers  to remain 
jobless  longer  than  they  otherwise  would.  This  is an effect  of the system  on 
the duration  of unemployment  of uncovered  workers,  and it represents 
another  bias concealing  its true  impact. 
The study  of post-exhaustion  data  is not well integrated  into the rest  of 
the paper.  I agree  with Marston  that one learns  little from  these  data,  be- 
cause  the exhaustees  represent  only 6 percent  of those who get into the 
unemployment  insurance  system.  But,  to the  extent  that  they  are  believable, 
the results  are alarming.  Right  after  exhaustion,  the rate of leaving  unem- 
ployment  shoots  up (see Marston's  figure  2). Part  of that increase  consists 
of people  who leave  the labor  force,  but part  clearly  consists  of those who 
take  jobs. If every  insured  worker  were  delaying  his exit from  unemploy- 
ment  to the same  degree  as, apparently,  do those  who have  exhausted  their 
benefits,  unemployment  insurance  would be lengthening  unemployment 
substantially. 
This paper  seems  to assume  the need for a policy that shortens  unem- 
ployment.  The "good"  of unemployment  insurance  is taken  to be the redis- 
tribution  of income,  and the "bad"  is taken as the inefficiency  of longer 
spells.  These  judgments  presume  that there are no external  economies 
associated  with unemployment.  I have written  a paper  that suggests  that 
unemployment  has  important  external  economies,  because  the unemployed 
act  as a "spare  tire"  for employers.  Thus,  unemployment  insurance  may  be Stephen  T. Marston  51 
just what  is needed  to compensate  unemployed  workers  for providing  that 
service. 
Charles  C. Holt:  Stephen  Marston's  paper  constitutes  a significant  piece  of 
work,  the  best  investigation  yet on the  effect  of unemployment  insurance  on 
unemployment.  I would  like to raise  some questions  about  the theoretical 
specification  and  the statistical  methods  and  then  comment  on some  policy 
issues  that  the paper  helps  to clarify. 
First,  I want  to express  my doubts  about  the formula  for the continua- 
tion rate used in the paper,  which  makes that rate exponential  with the 
duration  of unemployment.  Appendix  A  contains certain assumptions 
about  the  probability  distributions  of continuation  rates  for  particular  indi- 
viduals  having  to do with the so-called  sorting  process,  which  the paper 
doesn't  really  discuss.  The rigorous  theory  in that appendix  has implica- 
tions for the specification  of the continuation  rate, and I think that the 
question  of the  correct  functional  form  for  that  rate  justifies  more  attention. 
As this  paper  clearly  says,  the continuation  rate  reflects  a kind  of residual 
category.  The decision  that people  are making  each month  is to accept  a 
job or, alternatively,  to leave the labor  force. If they do neither,  they con- 
tinue  to be unemployed.  The two decisions  are subject  to quite different 
considerations,  so that  a more  correct  and  more  adequate  theoretical  speci- 
fication  would  be to estimate  the two types  of behavior  independently.  For 
practical  estimation  purposes,  the form  Marston  has used  is probably  ade- 
quate,  but that issue  needs  to be dealt  with in further  work. 
The  discussion  in the  paper  of duration  of unemployment  as measured  in 
the Current  Population  Survey  does not capture  all of the special  features 
of that survey.  The CPS is more complicated  than a random  sample  that 
simply  asks people whether  they are unemployed  and for how long. The 
sample  is "reentrant":  an individual  is in the sample  for four  months,  out 
for eight  months,  and back in for another  four months.  Autocorrelation 
will  arise  between  successive  months,  because  many  of the  individuals  in the 
sample  this  month  will be in it the next  month.  This  process  will  not neces- 
sarily  bias the results,  but a procedure  that explicitly  accounts for the 
longitudinal  aspects  of the CPS could be more  powerful. 
Given that unemployment  insurance  increases  unemployment,  is this 
"good"  or "bad"?  The  paper  explicitly  leaves  this  question  to further  study, 
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because  of better  job matching  and enhanced  productivity,  and this result 
is certainly  good. The production  lost during  longer  search  time could be 
considered  bad,  though  the increase  in leisure  would  be an offsetting  good. 
Unemployment  insurance  inhibits  withdrawal  from  the labor  force,  result- 
ing in an increase  in unemployment  that is not associated  with lost pro- 
duction,  as Martin  Feldstein  implicitly  assumes.  The  increase  in labor  force 
participation  may  lead to more  output  and so it is good, though  the effect 
is probably  small  and  costs  something  in leisure.  The  net social  effect  of this 
type  of unemployment  increase  is very  subtle,  compared  to the clear  losses 
that  result  from  deficient  demand. 
When unemployment  is high, unemployment  insurance  is unlikely  to 
have  much  effect  on employment.  Most of its effect  on unemployment  will 
be concentrated  on labor  force  participation.  So I don't think  we have to 
worry  that unemployment  insurance  significantly  depresses  output when 
we are  concerned  about  very  high levels  of unemployment. 
If the effects  of unemployment  insurance  on the duration  of unemploy- 
ment  are  deemed  undesirable,  the  remedy  is not necessarily  a cut  in benefits. 
An alternative  is institutionalizing  job search;  people  who don't  find  work 
for themselves  could  be placed  by an intensified  employment-service  effort. 
The philosophy  of the manpower  programs  that  have  been  developed  in 
Sweden  is implicitly  critical  of U.S. practices  regarding  unemployment  in- 
surance.  The Swedes  argue  that it is a great  waste  simply  to pay an unem- 
ployed  worker  benefits  that  are  almost  as large  as the cost of a training  pro- 
gram.  If the worker  is quickly  enrolled  in such a program,  the period  of 
joblessness  is used for building  human  capital  and not lost. Whether  this 
practice  is desirable  depends  upon how much  unemployment  time is pro- 
ductively  spent  searching  and  how much  time  is lost in  just waiting. But  the 
Swedish  approach  highlights  the need to examine  the interaction  between 
unemployment  insurance  and other  kinds  of manpower  programs. 
Martin  S. Feldstein:  Stephen  Marston  has given  us a pioneering  paper  on 
an important  topic. He applies  imaginative  statistical  techniques  to a wide 
range  of data.  The results  represent  the first  estimates  based  on microeco- 
nomic data that are not vitiated  by limiting  the analysis  to a single  state. 
Reasonable  people  can  differ  about  the  definition  of "large"  and  "small" 
effects.  To me, Marston's  estimates  imply  that  the  unemployment  insurance 
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annual  number  of unemployed  workers  (in a more  typical  year  than 1975) 
by more  than  500,000. 
Unemployment  compensation  can affect  the level of unemployment  in 
two very different  ways.  First, for those who are already  unemployed,  it 
provides  an incentive  to lengthen  unemployment.  Second,  for both em- 
ployers  and  employees  involved  in unsteady  work-seasonal, cyclical,  and 
casual-it provides  an incentive  to organize  production  in a way that in- 
creases  unemployment  by aggravating  seasonal  and cyclical  variations  and 
by making  casual  and  temporary  jobs too common;  it does  so by raising  the 
net  wage  to the  employee  relative  to the cost to the employer.  In particular, 
the current  unemployment  insurance  system  with  untaxed  benefits  and im- 
perfect  experience  rating  of employers  encourages  temporary  layoffs  instead 
of the smoothing  of production  or variation  in inventories  and in average 
hours.  The more I think about unemployment  and about the unemploy- 
ment  insurance  system,  the more  important  I believe  these  temporary  lay- 
offs  to be. Even  in a year  of relatively  high  unemployment  like 1971  (when 
the  unemployment  rate  was  5.9  percent),  manufacturing  firms  were  rehiring 
about  85 percent  of the workers  that they had previously  laid off. 
This  effect  of temporary  layoffs  is ignored  by Marston's  estimates,  which 
deal exclusively  with the effect of unemployment  insurance  on duration. 
Moreover,  temporary  layoffs  may  create  a quite  different  problem  in inter- 
preting  Marston's  results  on duration.  If those temporarily  laid off suffer 
shorter  joblessness  than others  who must  find  a new job, an increase  in the 
number  of temporary  layoffs  would  tend to lower  the duration  of insured 
unemployment  relative  to the duration  of uninsured  unemployment.  Since 
85 percent  of those  laid off in manufacturing  are  rehired  by the same  firms, 
this effect  of induced  layoffs  could be large. 
With  these  two caveats  in mind,  let me summarize  Marston's  estimates 
and  their  implications  for the effect  of unemployment  insurance  on the un- 
employment  rate.  After  adjusting  for demographic  differences  between  the 
insured  and  the uninsured,  Marston  estimates  that  the average  duration  of 
completed  spells  of unemployment  is 31 percent  greater  for the insured  un- 
employed  than  for the uninsured  unemployed.  Since  approximately  50 per- 
cent of the unemployed  are covered  by unemployment  insurance,  Mar- 
ston's  estimate  implies  that  eliminating  the system  would  reduce  the mean 
duration  of unemployment  for all the unemployed  by 12  percent.  With  the 
unemployment  rate  averaging  4.8 percent  for the past twenty-five  years,  a 54  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
12  percent  reduction  would  lower  it by 0.58 percentage  point.  For the cur- 
rent  labor  force  of approximately  90 million,  this entails  additional  unem- 
ployment  of 500,000  man-years  annually.  Furthermore,  this calculation 
ignores  the additional  unemployment  caused  by more  frequent  layoffs  and, 
because  of the effect  of temporary  layoffs  on the duration  of insured  unem- 
ployment,  may  understate  even  the duration  component  of the induced  in- 
crease  in unemployment. 
This estimate  is somewhat  greater  than Marston's.  He ignores  the cov- 
ered  unemployed  during  the period  before  they  register.  Since  he estimates 
that this period  averages  1.1 weeks  out of the total mean duration  of 5.6 
weeks,  the official  number  of covered  unemployed  must be increased  by 
nearly  one-fourth.  Although  this group  is not receiving  benefits,  their  be- 
havior  will be influenced  by the knowledge  that they  can collect  if they do 
not become  employed.  This element  helps  to reconcile  Marston's  estimate 
with my guess  for the Joint  Economic  Committee  that the lengthening  of 
duration  caused  by unemployment  insurance  added  0.75 percentage  point 
to the unemployment  rate.  My estimate  was for 1971-72,  when  the unem- 
ployment  rate was 5.75 percent.  The 12 percent  reduction  implied by 
Marston's  figures  indicates  a change  of 0.69 percent.  I am surprised  at how 
close these  two estimates  are. 
Although  Marston  has no specific  data on the subject,  he suggests  that 
women  and  young  people  may  be more  sensitive  to the incentives  of unem- 
ployment  insurance  than adult males. Using an arbitrary  procedure  to 
choose  a relative  differential,  he obtains  a new estimate  for the differential 
in aggregate  duration  of between  16  and  22 percent.  He then  uses 16  and  31 
percent  as lower  and  upper  bounds  on the  differential  attributable  to unem- 
ployment  insurance.  I don't think that the lower bound deserves  serious 
attention.  The  procedure  of maximizing  the differential  subject  to the con- 
straint  that the duration  does not fall for men is purely  arbitrary.  More- 
over,  it could  be argued  that,  with  their  family  responsibilities,  adult  males, 
in the absence  of unemployment  insurance,  would be forced  to obtain  a 
new job as quickly  as possible  while secondary  workers  could take their 
time. This line of reasoning  suggests  that primary  workers  may be more 
sensitive  to unemployment  insurance  than secondary  workers.  Estimates 
based on this assumption  would imply a greater  differential  in aggregate 
duration  than 31 percent;  if 16 percent  is a plausible  lower  bound  for the 
differential,  the plausible  upper  bound  is likely to be substantially  higher 
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seems  best  to focus  on the  31 percent  estimate  while  acknowledging  a range 
of possible  values  above  and below  it. 
I turn  now to some technical  comments  on Marston's  method of esti- 
mating  the effect  of unemployment  insurance  on mean duration.  He de- 
velops  a useful  statistical  model  of stochastic  duration  with  which  to calcu- 
late expected  durations  of completed  spells. He tries hard to adjust  for 
demographic  and cyclical  effects  in order  to make the durations  for the 
insured  and the uninsured  as comparable  as possible.  Nevertheless,  the 
computation  has so many  problems  that I am frankly  surprised  that Mar- 
ston's  estimates  are so plausible. 
First,  an insured  unemployed  individual  and an uninsured  one are very 
different  from  one another  even  after  account  is taken  of demographic  dif- 
ferences.  The uninsured  unemployed  are mostly new entrants,  reentrants 
without  sufficient  recent  experience,  workers  who quit their  previous  jobs, 
and  those  who previously  worked  in uncovered  employment  in such  atypi- 
cal industries  as agriculture  and domestic  service.  In contrast,  most of the 
insured  unemployed  are workers  with sufficient  employment  in covered 
occupations  to be insured,  who have been temporarily  or permanently 
laid off. Surely,  the expected  durations  of unemployment  for these two 
groups  would be very different  even if unemployment  insurance  had no 
effect. 
Second,  Marston's  data  on insured  unemployed  workers  come  from  the 
Detroit  SMSA,  where  the character  of insured  unemployment  is bound  to 
be heavily  influenced  by the auto industry.  For example,  because  of their 
high wages,  auto workers  with seniority  who are laid off are unlikely  to 
look elsewhere  for employment;  their  durations  of unemployment  are de- 
termined  by their employer  rather  than by themselves.  It is significant, 
therefore,  that the unemployment  insurance  program  in Michigan  has an 
atypical  experience  rating.  The 6 percent  maximum  tax on employers  in 
1971  was the highest  in the country,  nearly  double  the average  of 3.5 per- 
cent. Baily  recently  reported  that in 1967  only 14 percent  of Michigan  un- 
employment  insurance  benefits  in manufacturing  were  charged  to firms  at 
the maximum  tax (for which  additional  benefits  therefore  imply  no addi- 
tional  costs),  while  the corresponding  figure  was 50 percent  in Massachu- 
setts  and 59 percent  in New York.' 
Third,  comparing  the duration  of insured  unemployment  in Detroit  with 
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that  for the  nation  raises  new  problems  of adjusting  for  labor  market  tight- 
ness.  The national  estimate  is based  on the 1969  Current  Population  Sur- 
vey, while  the estimate  for the Detroit  SMSA  is based  on time-series  data 
for 1966  through  1971.  During  these  years  there  was substantial  variation 
in unemployment.  Unfortunately,  in the regression  equation  used for this 
adjustment  the relevant  coefficients  are very imprecise:  -0.098  with a 
standard  error  of 0.109 and -0.116  with a standard  error  of 0.073. 
Fourth,  as a further  problem  in measuring  the duration  of insured  unem- 
ployment,  Marston's  data allow him to measure  only the mean  length of 
the insured  spell  from  the time  that  the individual  registers  with  the unem- 
ployment  insurance  agency.  Some  individuals  will not register  immediately 
after they have been laid off. The scheduling  of unemployment  claims 
apparently  also involves  a delay.  Marston  estimates  that an additional  1.1 
weeks  must  be added  to the calculated  Detroit  mean  to get a correct  total 
duration  for the insured  unemployed.  The only basis  for this estimate  ap- 
pears  to be a 1958  report  by the Department  of Labor  based on Indiana 
experience;  and it is nearly  as large  as the entire  differential  between  in- 
sured  and uninsured  unemployment. 
I am puzzled  by Marston's  conclusion  that the average  ratio of unem- 
ployment  insurance  benefits  to lost net wages  could  be as low as 50 percent. 
As he notes, in my study  for the Joint  Economic  Committee,  I provided 
examples  of "typical"  situations  in Massachusetts,  where  unemployment 
insurance  would  replace  more  than  80 percent  of the net  earnings  lost by an 
additional  week  of unemployment.  Because  these  results  were  criticized  as 
reflecting  atypical  families  in an atypical  state,  I prepared  extensive  calcula- 
tions for all states and for thirteen  family  types.2  For men with median 
earnings  for their  state,  the national  mean  replacement  rate  exceeds  60 per- 
cent;  for women  with  median  earnings,  the replacement  is over  70 percent. 
The unemployed  have earnings  lower  than the average;  men with 70 per- 
cent of the earnings  of their  state  have  a national  average  replacement  rate 
of 69 percent,  while  married  women  at that  relative  level  have  a 78 percent 
replacement  rate.  Marston  reports  that even the unemployment  insurance 
service  of the Department  of Labor  finds  that benefits  are in the range  of 
60 to 70 percent  of net  wages.  His  lower  bound  of approximately  50 percent 
appears  to be a compromise  between  this evidence  and the estimate  of 
Munts  and Garfinkel  that  the relevant  replacement  rate  is only  between  40 
2. Feldstein,  "Unemployment  Compensation:  Adverse  Incentives  and Distributional 
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and 50 percent.3  The Munts-Garfinkel  analysis  suffers  from at least two 
problems:  First,  they  chose  Ohio  for their  calculation.  In 1971  (their  sam- 
ple covered  1971-72)  only  five  states  had a lower  level of maximum  unem- 
ployment  insurance  benefits  than  Ohio  ($47)  although  over  forty  states  had 
a lower  average  wage  in covered  employment.  For states  with  comparable 
average  wages  ($155  to $165),  maximum  benefits  were  20 percent  higher  in- 
cluding  dependents'  allowance  and 50 percent  higher  for a worker  with  no 
dependents.  Second,  their "replacement  ratio"  is the ratio of unemploy- 
ment  insurance  benefits  to the sum of lost net wages  plus fringe  benefits. 
Since  they  estimate  that  these  fringe  benefits  are  approximately  25 percent 
of the gross  wage  and an even  higher  fraction  of the net wage,  this adjust- 
ment  is very  important.  Because  this  relative  value  of fringe  benefits  relates 
to all workers,  this  figure  no doubt  overstates  the  benefits  lost by the unem- 
ployed,  many  of whom have health  and pension  benefits  that are poorer 
than  the average.  Moreover,  a substantial  portion  of the fringe  benefits- 
approximately  one-third  is accounted  for by leave  time  including  paid  holi- 
days and another  third  by retirement  programs-may not be affected  by 
temporary  layoffs.  I stili believe  that the best summary  of this issue  is that 
for most  covered  workers  unemployment  insurance  now replaces  approxi- 
mately  two-thirds  of lost net earnings. 
Marston  carefully  avoided  discussion  of the welfare  effects  of unemploy- 
ment  insurance  and  the policy  implications  of his findings.  Nevertheless,  he 
concluded  that  the "advocates  of unemployment  insurance  quite  probably 
could  justify  this small cost [of increased  unemployment]  in terms  of in- 
come  redistribution  and  the more  efficient  job matches  that  longer  searches 
permit."  Recall,  however,  that Marston's  figures  imply an extra 500,000 
man-years  of unemployment  annually,  and that this increment  relates  to 
only  part-perhaps  only  a small  part-of  the extra  unemployment  induced 
by the  current  unemployment  insurance  system.  Note also that  my analysis 
of the  Pechman-Okner  MERGE  file  implied  that  in 1970,  only one-sixth  of 
unemployment  insurance  benefits  went to families with incomes under 
$5,000  while  one-sixth  went to families  with incomes  over $20,000.  Fur- 
thermore,  does unemployment  insurance  increase  the "efficiency"  of job 
matches,  or, instead,  induce  longer searches  that, because  they are sub- 
sidized,  are  wasteful  for society  even  though  they  are  economically  rational 
for the individuals? 
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Although  I have  stressed  the  limitations  of Marston's  analysis,  it must  be 
regarded  as an important  assault  on a difficult  problem.  The substantial 
estimated  effect  of unemployment  insurance  on duration  deepens  my con- 
viction  that the time has come to consider  ways of reducing  the harmful 
disincentive  effects  of the system  through  such  means  as (1) including  bene- 
fits in taxable  income,  (2) improving  experience  rating of employers  by 
eliminating  the  minimum  and  maximum  rates,  and  (3) using  unemployment 
loans  as well  as nonrepayable  benefits  as part  of the  program.  If the sources 
of adverse  incentives  are  removed  or reduced,  the unemployment  insurance 
program  can  be expanded  and  the  benefits  enlarged  without  fear  of harmful 
effects. 
Stephen  T. Marston:  Martin  Feldstein  identifies  my estimate  of the maxi- 
mum  impact  on unemployment  duration  with  the  impact  itself.  Contrary  to 
Feldstein,  31 percent  is a high  estimate  of the expansion  in unemployment 
duration  due to unemployment  insurance  for at least two reasons:  (1) My 
demographic  adjustment  assumes  proportional  increases  in duration  for 
each group,  whereas  a more realistic  assumption  of greater  increases  for 
secondary  workers  would lower the estimate.  (2) Even after listening  to 
Hall,  I am convinced  that  job losers  remain  unemployed  longer  than  other 
unemployed  workers,  other  factors  aside. If I were able to allow for the 
special  problems  of job losers,  my estimate  would  be cut still further. 
Moreover,  my estimated  31 percent  lengthening  of unemployment  will 
not necessarily  translate  into a similar  expansion  of unemployment  unless 
the number  of spells  of unemployment  and the behavior  of uninsured  un- 
employed  workers  do not change.  But in a world  of limited  employment 
opportunities,  some  of the shortening  of unemployment  of insured  workers 
would mean displacement  of other  workers,  thus probably  leading  to an 
unemployment  impact  less than the estimated  duration  impact. 
Finally,  my estimated  impact  on unemployment  has two parts:  a weak- 
ening in employment  and a strengthening  of labor force participation. 
Only  the former  is likely  to cut output;  the latter,  if it has any effect,  must 
certainly  be favorable  to the Phillips  curve. 
The last two objections  will be especially  serious  if one extrapolates  my 
results  to weaker  labor  markets,  as Feldstein  does.  The impact  on employ- 
ment  will  not be proportionally  increased  with  a hike  in the unemployment 
rate; in fact, it will be reduced. 
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by Charles  Holt might  be important  for estimating  the continuation  rate 
itself,  but not for estimating  the expected  duration  of insured  unemploy- 
ment. I tried various  alternative  forms, including  one derived  from the 
theoretical  specification  of appendix  A; they all fit slightly  worse  than the 
one I used,  but gave  similar  expected  durations. 
General  Discussion 
The  panel  emphasized  the  impact  of unemployment  insurance  upon  both 
dimensions  of the  Phillips  curve.  Franco  Modigliani  viewed  unemployment 
insurance  as artificially  increasing  a variable  that reflects  labor market 
pressure,  such  as  job vacancies.  This  process  would  have the effect-men- 
tioned in the paper and emphasized  by Michael  Wachter-that wages 
would be pressed  upward  at the same time that unemployment  swelled. 
Thus, even if output  and employment  were exogenous,  a possibility  dis- 
cussed  by Wachter  and Barry  Bosworth,  unemployment  insurance  would 
still  have  the undesirable  impact  of increasing  wage  inflation.  Nonetheless, 
Bosworth  concluded  from  recent  estimates  of labor  demand  and  wage  elas- 
ticity  that  the  increase  in unemployment  would  be small,  even  if unemploy- 
ment  insurance  pushed  up wages  significantly.  Arthur  Okun  reminded  the 
panelists  that unemployment  insurance  has an effect  that operates  in the 
opposite  direction-namely,  that  it keeps  discouraged  workers  in the labor 
force  where  they exert  downward  pressure  on wages. 
Robert  Hall  reiterated  his view  that  job losers  might  have  a shorter  dura- 
tion of unemployment  than  other  unemployed  people  if not for the impact 
of unemployment  insurance.  He cited  a few  examples;  but Stephen  Marston 
thought  the reasons  could  not outweigh  the special  disadvantages  faced  by 
job losers  in finding  employment  as compared  with  voluntary  job leavers. 
Okun  pointed  out that job losers will have employment  information  in- 
ferior  to that of job leavers,  although  perhaps  better  than that of new 
entrants  into the labor  force. Hall replied  that conventional  thinking  on 
these  points  could not be relied  upon and cited a surprising  finding  that 
job losers  get a greater  increment  in wages  moving  from one job to the 
next  than  do voluntary  job leavers. 
Empirical  evidence  on this  point  is difficult  to interpret  because  job losers 
and unemployment  insurance  recipients  are so closely  associated  that it is 
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to unemployment  duration.  George Perry, Martin Feldstein, and Hall 
agreed  that Marston's  data showing  that the expected  duration  of unem- 
ployment  of job losers  was longer  than that of other  unemployed  persons 
was  indicative  but  not conclusive,  in that  this relationship  could  have  been 
due  to demographic  factors  or to unemployment  insurance  itself. 
Lawrence  Klein  suggested  a similar  bias.  If insured  unemployed  workers 
come from occupations  and industries  much different  from those of the 
uninsured  unemployed,  these  factors  will  be confused  in Marston's  analysis 
with  the impact  of unemployment  insurance  itself. 
Responding  to an issue raised  by Feldstein,  Marston  defended  his as- 
sumption  that  primary  workers  are  no more  susceptible  to unemployment 
insurance  incentives  than  are  secondary  workers,  citing  a study  by Lininger 
and  the force  of custom  on primary  workers.  Bosworth  agreed,  pointing  to 
the findings  of the New Jersey  experiment  with the negative  income  tax. 
Bosworth  also  thought  that  that  experiment  supported  Marston's  general 
finding  that the work-incentive  effects  of income subsidies  are relatively 
small.  But Hall disagreed  with that interpretation,  saying  that the 50 per- 
cent  marginal  tax rate  imposed  by the experiment  reduced  labor  supply  by 
8 percent. 
Modigliani  favored  unemployment  insurance  policies  that minimize  the 
amount  of unproductive  unemployed  time but do not cut into productive 
job-search  time.  He qualified  that  position,  however,  since  both  productive 
and unproductive  extensions  in time unemployed  will have the effect of 
pushing  up wage inflation.  Like Charles  Holt, Modigliani  and Wachter 
both thought  America  had a lot to learn  from  Sweden  in its programs  for 
unemployed  workers.  R. J. Gordon considered  the negative  income  tax 
as a substitute  for unemployment  insurance,  whose income inequities  it 
would  repair. 
Stanley  Horowitz  shed  some  light  on the  productivity  of increased  unem- 
ployment  time resulting  from unemployment  insurance.  Research  by his 
colleague,  Kathleen  Classen,  indicates  that, although  workers  remain  un- 
employed  longer  the more  they receive  in unemployment  benefits,  they do 
not find  better  jobs after  their  extended  unemployment. 